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Social Networking and
Workers’ Compensation Law at
the Crossroads
Jaclyn S. Millner* and Gregory M. Duhl**
Abstract
Over the past decade, social networking has increasingly
influenced the practice of both civil and criminal law. One way
to illustrate those influences is to examine a “system” of laws
and the parties and lawyers in that system. In this Article, we
examine how social networking has influenced workers‟
compensation law. In particular, this Article looks at the
intersection of professional responsibility, discovery, privacy,
and evidence with social networking in state workers‟
compensation systems.
Workers‟ compensation laws are no-fault insurance
systems designed to resolve disputes efficiently. Consequently,
the rules of evidence are often more relaxed and the rules of
discovery often more restricted than in state and federal court
litigation. The flexible and self-contained structure of workers‟
compensation systems provides an ideal backdrop against
which to examine how information from social networking sites
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can be used as evidence to resolve civil disputes.
A state‟s workers‟ compensation system should use the
rules that have traditionally applied to non-electronic
information as a starting point to address issues arising from
lawyers gathering and introducing into evidence information
stored on social networking sites. At the same time, because of
the efficiency of workers‟ compensation law and the large
discretion vested in its judges, workers‟ compensation systems
have the potential to be laboratories for new technologies and
how they can be used in the resolution of disputes, both inside
and outside of workers‟ compensation.
I. Introduction
Workers‟ compensation systems1 provide a backdrop
against which to examine how lawyers and judges can use
evidence from social networking sites to help resolve civil
disputes. An employee2 alleging a workplace injury can
communicate feelings, information, or photographs on a social
networking site that contradict her claim. While the employee‟s
attorney should counsel her client to exercise caution in
making such communications, defense counsel3 faces the
1. Each state has its own workers‟ compensation system governed by
state statute and administrative rules. See Office of Disability Employment
Policy, U.S. DEP‟T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/odep/pubs/fact/employ.htm
(last visited Aug. 22, 2010) (“Workers‟ Compensation laws are administered
at the state level. . . . Because each state has its own system, coverage
varies.”). In this Article, we focus on the common elements of those systems.
2. We use “employee” and “plaintiff” interchangeably in this Article to
refer to the workers‟ compensation claimant. The claimant could be a former
employee if employed at the time the alleged injury occurred.
3. In workers‟ compensation litigation, the “defense” includes both the
employer and insurer. The employer contracts with the insurer to provide
workers‟ compensation coverage. We use “defense counsel” in this Article to
refer to counsel for the employer and the insurer, whether the same or
different. The insurer typically controls the litigation, as the insurer is the
party paying workers‟ compensation benefits to the employee. See, e.g.,
Herring v. Jackson, 122 S.E.2d 366, 371-72 (N.C. 1961) (finding the insurer to
be the “real party in interest” because the employer had nothing to gain or
lose in the action and any recovered amount would inure to the insurance
company); Russell v. W. Oil Co., 174 S.E. 101, 104 (N.C. 1934) (“The insurer
is practically the real party to the controversy and controls the litigation.”).
Most workers‟ compensation insurance policies also provide language
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challenge of gathering and introducing such communications
into evidence.4
Despite this potential for social networking evidence, its
use in workers‟ compensation cases and civil litigation more
generally is uncommon. Consequently, there is a relative
absence of cases, statutes, rules, and ethics opinions that
prescribe attorney conduct in gathering and introducing such
evidence. Because workers‟ compensation systems are intended
to be discrete, efficient, and discretionary, they are ideal
systems within which to explore how social networking and
other new technologies can be used in the resolution of
disputes.
Workers‟ compensation laws are no-fault, providing
compensation for job-related injuries5 and offering a more
efficient mechanism for claim resolution than trial courts.6
They protect employees by providing assured and prompt
compensation for work-related injuries and consequential loss
of income without the parties and attorneys expending the
excessive time and resources typical of state and federal court
litigation.7
indicating that the insurer controls the litigation, and the employer must
assist the insurer in litigation against the employee upon request.
4. See Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-Discovery
Frontier, MINN. BENCH & B., Nov. 2009, at 23, available at
http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2009/nov09/networking.html
(“Experienced attorneys know that embracing new technologies—such as
social networking sites—can make the difference between winning and losing
cases.”).
5. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 (“The Legislature is hereby
expressly vested with plenary power, unlimited by any provision of this
Constitution, to create, and enforce a complete system of workers‟
compensation, by appropriate legislation, and in that behalf to create and
enforce a liability on the part of any or all persons to compensate any or all of
their workers for injury or disability, and their dependents for death incurred
or sustained by the said workers in the course of their employment,
irrespective of the fault of any party.”); Curtis v. G.E. Capital Modular Space,
155 S.W.3d 877, 884 (Tenn. 2005) (“To do so would confuse the fault-based
liability of tort with the statutorily imposed „no fault‟ liability of workers‟
compensation.”).
6. United Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 993 P.2d 1152,
1161 (Colo. 2000) (“Traditionally, workers‟ compensation laws have provided
an efficient system for remedying the effects of allocating the costs of
industrial injuries.”).
7. Ruggery v. N.C. Dep‟t of Corr., 520 S.E.2d 77, 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)
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Similarly, social networking sites enable individuals to
exchange information efficiently over the Internet.8 Social
networking provides a structure for people to express their
personalities and identities, and meet people with similar
interests.9 Individuals can have online profiles,10 friends,11
blogs, discussions, and groups.12 Users may also post pictures,
videos, and other information to their social networking
profiles.13 By facilitating connections with friends, relatives,
and those with similar interests, social networking creates a
sense of intimacy and community for users.14
(“The policy underlying the Worker‟s Compensation Act is to „provide a swift
and certain remedy to an injured worker and to ensure a limited and
determinate liability for employers.‟” (quoting Matthews v. CharlotteMecklenburg Hosp., 510 S.E.2d 388, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999))); Lascio v.
Belcher Roofing Corp., 704 A.2d 642, 644-45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (“[The]
purpose of [the workers‟ compensation system] is to protect employees by
providing quick and certain compensation for work-related injuries and
resultant loss of injuries without wasting time and expenses on litigation.”).
8. See Kristi L. Gustafson, Social Networks Alter Class Reunion
Dynamics,
ALBANY
TIMES
UNION
(Apr.
29,
2010),
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/life/main/6980262.html
(“Social
networking is an efficient, cost-effective way to share information.”).
9. See Daniel Nations, What Is Social Networking?, ABOUT.COM,
http://webtrends.about.com/od/socialnetworking/a/social-network.htm
(last
visited Aug. 20, 2010).
10. Profiles include basic information, including a person‟s age, location,
and interests. See id.
11. “Friends are trusted members of [an individual‟s profile] [who] are
allowed to post comments on [the] profile or send [the individual] private
messages.” Id. When a person sends an invitation to someone to become a
“friend” on Facebook or another social networking site, if the individual
accepts, the inviter and invitee have access to each other‟s information and
can communicate with one another. See Definition of Friending, PCMAG.COM,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=friending&i=61604,00.as
p (last visited Aug. 20, 2010). After “friending” another social networking
user on the same site, friends can be subsequently “defriended” or
“unfriended,” which terminates the “friendship” and users‟ access to each
other‟s information. Id. Not all social networking sites use the term “friends”;
LinkdIn, for example, uses the term “connections.” See Nations, supra note 9.
However, all sites permit a user to designate another member as trusted and
give that person access to the user‟s information. Id.
12. See Nations, supra note 9. Groups enable social networking users on
a site to find people with similar interests or backgrounds. Id. A group can
have any sort of focus, from “Diet Coke Lovers” to “Valley High School Class
of 1999” to a particular book, television show, or movie. Id.
13. See id.
14. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23 (“Social networking sites are now
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Nearly half of all adult Americans have a social
networking profile,15 with Facebook and MySpace being the
most popular sites.16 As social networking continues to play an
increasingly prevalent role in society, lawyers and judges
involved in workers‟ compensation will have to confront
discovery, professional responsibility, privacy, and evidentiary
issues that arise in connection with social networking
evidence.17
Part II of this Article discusses legal issues related to
gathering information stored on a social networking site from
both the employee and social networking site operator. Part III
goes on to address professional responsibility issues that arise
for plaintiffs‟ and defense attorneys in connection with an
employee maintaining, and defense counsel gathering,
information stored on a social networking site. Part IV
discusses issues relating to admitting social networking
evidence at the time of a workers‟ compensation hearing or
trial, after it has been obtained by defense counsel. We
conclude in Part V that workers‟ compensation systems should
use the existing rules governing the discovery and admissibility
widely recognized to be a key source of information regarding a person
because „[a]lthough these sites provide users with a sense of intimacy and
community, they also create a potentially permanent record of personal
information that becomes a virtual information bonanza about a litigant‟s
private life and state of mind.‟” (quoting Ronald J. Levine & Susan L.
Swatski-Lebson, Are Social Networking Sites Discoverable?, LAW.COM (Nov.
13,
2008),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120242597
4937)).
15. See TOM WEBSTER, THE SOCIAL HABIT—FREQUENT SOCIAL
NETWORKERS: THE EDISON/ARBITRON INTERNET AND MULTIMEDIA STUDY 2010
(2010),
http://www.edisonresearch.com/The_Social_Habit_Edison_Social_Media_Stud
y_2010.pdf
(stating that a survey from February 2010 found 48% of Americans have a
profile on Facebook, MySpace, or another social networking site); Adults on
Social Network Sites, 2005-2009, PEW INTERNET (Oct. 8, 2009),
http://www.pewinternet.org/Infographics/Growth-in-Adult-SNS-Use20052009.aspx (stating that 46% of American adults use some type of social
networking site).
16. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23.
17. See id. (“Experienced attorneys know that embracing new
technologies—such as social networking sites—can make the difference
between winning and losing cases.”).
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of electronic and non-electronic information as a starting point
in addressing issues that arise at the crossroads of social
networking and workers‟ compensation law. As efficient
systems, providing considerable discretion to the judge,
workers‟ compensation laws offer lawyers and judges the
ability to address and explore the role of social networking
evidence in dispute resolution.
II. Discovering Employee Information Stored on Social
Networking Sites
This Part explores the legal issues that can arise when
defense counsel seeks an employee‟s communications and other
information stored on a social networking site. We address two
topics: (A) the extent to which an employee‟s information stored
on a social networking site is discoverable from the employee in
a workers‟ compensation case; and (B) the extent to which an
employee‟s information stored on a social networking site is
discoverable from the third-party site operator in a workers‟
compensation case. The employee‟s privacy and the Stored
Communications Act,18 part of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act,19 potentially limit discovery from the site operator.
A.

Discovery of Social Networking Information from the
Employee
This Part focuses on the rules regulating discovery20 in

18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
19. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
20. This Part uses the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to discuss
discovery in state workers‟ compensation courts. To date, the majority of
states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with minimal
changes.
See
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure,
USLEGAL.COM,
http://civilprocedure.uslegal.com/rules-of-civil-procedure/ (last visited Aug.
20, 2010) (“[T]hirty-five states have adopted the federal rules as their own
procedural code.”). In most states, though workers‟ compensation courts are
governed by administrative rules, they have adopted the state‟s rules of civil
procedure with regard to discovery. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 60Q6.114 (2006) (applying the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to workers‟
compensation proceedings); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-102(d)(1) (West 2008 &
Supp. 2009) (“Discovery procedures shall be governed and controlled by
Chapter 11 of Title 9, the „Georgia Civil Practice Act.‟”); IDAHO JUDICIAL R.
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PRAC. & P. 7(C) (2008) (“Procedural matters relating to discovery, except
sanctions, shall be controlled by the appropriate provisions of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-3(a) (West 2009) (“The worker‟s
compensation board may adopt rules under IC 4-22-2 to carry into effect the
worker‟s compensation law (IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6) and the worker‟s
occupational diseases law (IC 22-3-7).”); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 876-4.35(86)
(2009) (“The rules of civil procedure shall govern the contested case
proceedings before the workers‟ compensation commissioner . . . .”); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, ch. 4, app. r. 30 (West 2005) (“[P]roduction of documentary
evidence shall be obtained in accordance with Title 12 of the Oklahoma
Statutes [Oklahoma state rules of civil procedure].”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
656.285 (West 2003) (“ORCP [Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure] 36 C shall
apply to workers‟ compensation cases, except that the Administrative Law
Judge shall make the determinations and orders required of the court in
ORCP 36 C, and in addition attorney fees shall not be declared as a matter of
course but only in cases of harassment or hardship.”); Camelback
Contractors, Inc. v. Indus. Comm‟n, 608 P.2d 782, 785 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that discovery before the industrial commission in Arizona “should
not be more restrictive than that employed in superior court”); Mid-Delta
Home Health, Inc. v. Robertson, 749 So. 2d 379, 388 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
(“[The Workers‟ Compensation] Commission will not disregard the timehonored guidelines of discovery . . . .”).
States such as Minnesota, which follow more restrictive rules for
discovery in workers‟ compensation cases to speed up the claim-resolution
process, do permit the compensation judge to order discovery under the
state‟s rules of civil procedure. See MINN. R. 1420.2200, subpt. 3 (2006) (“The
judge may order discovery available under the Rules of Civil Procedure for
the district courts of Minnesota provided that the discovery: . . . is needed for
the proper presentation of a party‟s case . . . .”); Edeogu v. Bauerly Bros., Inc.,
No. WC05-202, 2005 MN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 247, at *5 (Minn. Work. Comp.
Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2005) (stating that the workers‟ compensation court may
rely on the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure).
Moreover, some states with more restrictive discovery rules specifically
permit surveillance as a form of discovery, see, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200,
subpt. 8(A) (2006), and informal discovery of social networking evidence is a
form of surveillance. Id. (“Surveillance evidence under this part includes any
photographic, video, digital, motion picture, or other electronic recording or
depiction of a party surreptitiously taken or obtained without the party‟s
expressed permission or knowledge.”); see also Anders Albrechtslund, Online
Social Networking as Participatory Surveillance, FIRST MONDAY (Mar. 2008),
http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2142/1949
(“First, online social networking is related to the traditional hierarchical
surveillance concept. . . . The word surveillance is etymologically associated
with the French word surveiller, which translates simply as to watch over.
The verb suggests the visual practice of a person looking carefully at someone
or something from above. Both in ordinary language and within academic
debate, the practice of „watching over‟ has become a metaphor for all other
monitoring activities. Thus, the understanding of surveillance is not limited
to a visual practice; rather it involves all senses—data collection and
technological mediation.”). Consequently, in states with restricted workers‟
compensation discovery rules, defense counsel can discover social networking
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workers‟ compensation cases and the few state and federal
cases that suggest defense counsel can acquire relevant
information stored on a social networking site from an
employee.
1. Background of E-Discovery and the Scope of Discovery
The discovery process makes relevant information
available to litigants.21 Electronic discovery allows parties to
obtain “electronically stored information” (ESI),22 a term
adopted by the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 2006.23 ESI includes digital information that can

evidence, either by following the rules for conducting surveillance or the
state‟s rules of civil procedure.
21. See Aaron Blank, On the Precipe of E-Discovery: Can Litigants
Obtain Employee Social Networking Web Site Information Through
Employers?, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 487, 495 (2010) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
26 advisory committee‟s note (1983)). “Discovery” describes evidence obtained
during the pre-trial stage of a lawsuit. See Ken LaMance, Electronic
Discovery—Can Contents of My Electronic Communications Be Used as
Evidence in Court?, EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?ElectronicDiscovery---Can-Contents-of-My-Electronic-Communications-Be-Used-AsEvidence-in-Court?&id=3962081 (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), 33(d), 34(a)(1)(A); see also LaMance,
supra note 21 (“Electronically Stored Information, or „ESI,‟ is an actual legal
term adopted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006. ESI refers to
information that is created, stored, and used in digital form, and requires the
use of a computer for access.”).
23. Blank, supra note 21, at 495-96; LaMance, supra note 21; see FED. R.
CIV. P. 26. The advisory committee found the amendments to be necessary for
two primary reasons:
First, electronically stored information has important
differences from information recorded on paper. The most
salient of these differences are that electronically stored
information is retained in exponentially greater volume
than hard-copy documents; electronically stored information
is dynamic, rather than static; and electronically stored
information may be incomprehensible when separated from
the system that created it. Second, these differences are
causing problems in discovery that rule amendments can
helpfully address.
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (July 25, 2005), SL061 ALIABA 1101, 1103 (Westlaw).
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be accessed only by computer.24 The rules regulating discovery
more generally also govern ESI.25
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) outlines the scope
of discovery, including the discovery of ESI. The scope of
discovery is broad, and non-privileged information that is
“relevant to any party‟s claim or defense” is discoverable.26
States that follow more limited rules of discovery for workers‟
compensation claims also use a relevancy standard with
respect to discovery of surveillance evidence,27 which includes
information stored on a social networking site. The standard
for determining “relevance” is “whether there is any possibility
that the information sought may be relevant to the subject
matter of the action.”28
As social networking continues to become more
widespread, information relevant to employees‟ workers‟
compensation claims could be available on Facebook and other
social networking sites.29 Such sites serve as a significant
24. LaMance, supra note 21. Examples of ESI include e-mails, websites,
and digitally stored documents and pictures. Id.
25. See id.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
27. See, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, subpt. 8(A) (2006) (indicating that
relevant surveillance evidence is discoverable).
28. AM Int‟l, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 100 F.R.D. 255, 257 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also TBG Ins.
Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 160 (Ct. App. 2002)
(“[The defendant] is entitled to discover any non-privileged information,
cumulative or not, that may reasonably assist it in developing its defense,
preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement.”); Blank, supra note 21, at 496
(“[The test for relevance is] whether there is any possibility that the
information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action.”
(quoting AM Int’l, 100 F.R.D. at 257) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 25 (“Attorneys can discover the user‟s
postings, list of friends, shared photos and videos, and other valuable
information. If a person has heightened security settings, attorneys may still
be able to discover the social networking account, but will not be able to
access the person‟s profile information unless the user provides permission
through granting a „friend‟ request. Even if attorneys can only gather limited
information informally, that information can provide a means to tailor
subsequent formal discovery.”); Leora Maccabee, Facebook 101: Why Lawyers
Should
Be
on
Facebook,
LAWYERIST.COM
(Apr.
23,
2009),
http://lawyerist.com/facebook-101-why-lawyers-should-be-on-facebook/
(“Facebook can be an effective tool for investigating defendants, witnesses,
and prosecutors. Evidence revealed from profile searches has been used . . . to
show the extent of plaintiffs‟ injuries after an accident.”). Take one example
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information source because, “[a]lthough [they] provide users
with a sense of intimacy and community, they also create a
potentially permanent record of personal information that
becomes a virtual information bonanza about a litigant‟s
private life and state of mind.”30 An employee alleging a
workplace injury could post photographs, communications, or
other information that either contradict a workplace injury
claim, or alert defense investigators of times and places to
engage in surveillance.31
2. Informal Discovery
Social networking information can be discovered both
formally and informally. Attorneys can informally discover
information by searching on Google, Yahoo!, or any other
search engine for the employee and seeing if a link to an
employee‟s social networking account comes up in the results.32
In addition, attorneys can search individual social networking
from a products liability case. A federal district court dismissed a welder‟s
claim when defense lawyers discovered pictures of him on Facebook racing
motorboats despite his disability claims. See Liz McKenzie, Poking Around
Facebook
Could
Win
Your
Case,
LAW360
(Feb.
4,
2010),
http://www.law360.com/articles/147130.
30. Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23 (quoting Levine & Swatski-Lebson,
supra note 14).
31. Roberto Ceniceros, Comp Cheats Confess All on Social Networking
Sites,
WORKFORCE
MGMT.
ONLINE
(Sept.
2009),
http://www.workforce.com/section/02/feature/26/66/08/ (“Then there is the
listing of physical activities . . . . [I]nvestigators found the claimant‟s
Facebook site and learned about his participation in bowling tournaments
and a bowling alley he frequented. . . . An investigator visiting the bowling
alley found a large banner congratulating the claimant for rolling a perfect
game and the date he rolled the game.”); Michael O‟Connor & Assocs., LLC,
Workers’ Compensation Investigators Use Social Networking Sites to Nab
Fraudulent Claimants, PA. WORKERS‟ COMPENSATION LAW. BLOG (Sept. 30,
2009,
9:19
AM),
http://www.pennsylvaniaworkerscompensationlawyersblog.com/2009/09/work
ers-compensation-investiga.html (“By searching for a claimant‟s profile on
sites like Facebook or MySpace, investigators can uncover a myriad of selfincriminating information, such as dates of sporting events in which the
claimant is participating. Social networking sites can also contain timestamped photos and videos showing claimants involved in physical activities
that could be outside the level of disability that the injured worker is
claiming.”).
32. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 23.
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sites, such as Facebook and MySpace, by the name of the
employee.33
Whether an individual‟s social networking profile and
information can be publicly viewed depends on the particular
social networking website and the individual‟s specific security
settings. By using the site‟s control settings, users of Facebook,
MySpace, and other social networking sites are able to control
whether the information provided on their profile is public or
private.34 A user may place his or her security settings on a
spectrum ranging from a completely public profile, which may
be viewed by anyone, to a private profile, which is accessible
only to individuals the user accepts as “friends” or
“connections.”35 Just as a workers‟ compensation attorney may
use informal discovery to observe an employee in a public
place, such as a park or a restaurant,36 so too is a workers‟
compensation attorney able to use informal discovery to
observe and search information publicly available online. When
conducting informal discovery, however, attorneys should be
cognizant of professional responsibility obligations.37
33. See id.
34. See id. (“Most social networking sites, including Facebook and
MySpace, enable individual users to control whether their information is
private or public and to whom it can be disseminated.”).
35. See id. (“The security settings range from uncensored, public profiles
that can be accessed and located through the social networking site or any
Internet search engine, to private profiles, accessible only to persons
designated as friends.”). If a particular user‟s Facebook account, for example,
has low security settings, the general public can access the individual‟s
profile by searching the Internet or by searching for the person‟s name on the
Facebook website. Attorneys and others can discover the individual‟s list of
friends, shared postings, photographs, and videos. See id. at 24. If an
individual sets high security settings, attorneys may still be able to discover
that the individual has a Facebook account but will not be able to view the
individual‟s profile or information unless the individual allows the attorney to
do so by extending or accepting a “friend” request. See id. Individuals with
very high security settings can even prevent the public from uncovering that
they have a Facebook account through searches on the Internet or the
Facebook website.
36. See Baumann v. Joyner Silver & Electroplating, 47 W.C.D. 611, 1992
MN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 622, at *15 n.3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. Sept. 1,
1992) (finding that, as a general rule, contact made to acquire information
that an employee would normally provide to the public in the course of public
activities is not proscribed conduct).
37. See infra Part III.
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3. Formal Discovery
Social networking information that is not publicly
available can be obtained through the formal discovery process.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a)(1)(A) allows a party to
request “any designated documents or electronically stored
information—including . . . data or data compilations—stored
in any medium” in “the responding party‟s possession, custody,
or control.”38 Accordingly, defense counsel may request any
information posted and stored on social networking websites,
including discussion and message postings, pictures, and
videos relevant to the employee‟s claim.
Employees in workers‟ compensation cases should disclose
such relevant information in response to narrowly tailored
discovery requests.39 If a plaintiff‟s attorney objects to the
production of this information, the defense attorney must
demonstrate its relevance.40 If a document request for social
networking information is at least facially relevant and the
plaintiff is able, but does not wish, to produce the relevant
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1), (a)(1)(A). Rule 34 was “intended to be broad
enough to cover all current types of computer-based information, and flexible
enough to encompass future changes and developments.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34
advisory committee‟s note. Rules 33 and 26(a)(1) also address formal
discovery of electronically stored information. See Michael A. Oakes, Meghan
A. Podolny & John W. Woods Jr., Social Networking Sites and the EDiscovery Process, DATA PROTECTION L. & POL‟Y (Feb. 2010),
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5C2856%5C
E-Discovery_DPLP_Feb10.pdf (“Firstly, the amendments introduced the
phrase „electronically stored information‟ to Rules 26(a)(1), 33, and 34 to
acknowledge that ESI is discoverable.”).
39. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 24 (“Courts are willing to require users
to produce social networking information in response to narrowly tailored
discovery requests.”); see also Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-CV01958-WYDMJW, 2009 WL 1067018, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009) (“[T]he
information sought within the four corners of the subpoenas issued to
Facebook, MySpace, Inc., and Meetup.com is reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence [and] is relevant to the issues in this
case.”); Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat‟l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No.
2:06CV00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *8 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007)
(finding that the employer could discover MySpace messages relating to
issues relevant to the case).
40. See Oakes, Podolny & Woods, supra note 38 (“Although ESI is
potentially discoverable—in any form—in US litigation, if a party objects to
the production of social networking data, the litigant seeking the information
will still be required to demonstrate its relevance.”).
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document, the plaintiff‟s attorney has the burden of
establishing that the document is not relevant in order to avoid
producing it.41
In EEOC v. Simply Storage Management, LLC, an
employment law case, a magistrate judge ordered employees to
produce social networking profile information from their
Facebook and MySpace accounts in response to a discovery
request.42 The EEOC filed a sexual harassment complaint on
behalf of two employees against their supervisor.43 It requested
a discovery conference because counsel disagreed about the
proper scope of discovery involving social networking
documents, including items from Facebook and MySpace.44 The
41. See Scott v. Leavenworth Unified Sch. Dist. No. 453, 190 F.R.D. 583,
585 (D. Kan. 1999) (“When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party
resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance . . .
.”); Blank, supra note 21, at 496 (“If a request for information is facially
relevant and the party does not wish to produce it, the producing party must
establish the document is not relevant.”).
42. EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1223-WTL-DML
(S.D. Ind. May 11, 2010) (order on discovery issues raised during April 21
conference),
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/full/31921843?access_key=key-2i8jdft9a1tammq659sv
[hereinafter Order on Discovery].
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2. The disputed documents requested through the formal
discovery process included:
Request No. 1: All photographs or videos posted by
Joanie Zupan or anyone on her behalf on Facebook or
MySpace from April 23, 2007 to the present.
Request No. 2: Electronic copies of Joanie Zupan‟s
complete profile on Facebook and MySpace (including all
updates, changes or modifications to Zupan‟s profile) and all
status updates, messages, wall comments, causes joined,
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, details, blurbs,
comments, and applications (including, but not limited to,
“How well do you know me” and the “Naughty Application”)
for the period from April 23, 2007 to the present. To the
extent electronic copies are not available, please provide the
documents in hard copy form.
Request No. 3: All photographs or videos posted by
Tara Strahl or anyone on her behalf on Facebook or
MySpace from October 11, 2007 to November 26, 2008.
Request No. 4: Electronic copies of Tara Strahl‟s
complete profile on Facebook and MySpace (including all
updates, changes, or modifications to Strahl‟s profile) and
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EEOC objected to the demand for the production of all
documents related to the plaintiffs‟ social networking accounts
and to deposition testimony about the employees‟ social
networking profiles on the grounds that the requests were
overbroad, not relevant, unduly burdensome, harassing, and
embarrassing toward the employees.45 Magistrate Judge Debra
Lynch found that the standard for discovery‟s scope is broad46
and noted that, where relevance is in doubt, the court should
be permissive.47
However, she also emphasized that the scope of discovery
is not limitless.48 The EEOC argued that discovery of Facebook
all status updates, messages, wall comments, causes joined,
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries, details, blurbs,
comments, and applications (including, but not limited to,
“How well do you know me” and the “Naughty Application”)
for the period from October 11, 2007 to November 26, 2008.
To the extent electronic copies are not available, please
provide these documents in hard copy form.
Id.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id. at 4; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b) reads:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party‟s claim or defense—including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.
For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to
the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
47. Order on Discovery, supra note 42, at 4; see also Truswal Sys. Corp.
v. Hydro-Air Eng‟g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing
the scope of Rule 26(b)(1)).
48. See Order on Discovery, supra note 42, at 4 (citing Rozell v. RossHolst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK)(JCF), 2006 WL 163143, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20,
2006)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) provides that:
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency
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and MySpace profiles should be limited to information that
directly relates to issues raised in the complaint.49 Ultimately,
Magistrate Judge Lynch found all social networking content
revealing, relating, or simply referring to allegations raised in
the complaint to be discoverable.50 Judge Lynch also found that
the fact that a user‟s profile is private and not available to the
public does not shield information in that user‟s profile from
discovery.51
Similarly, in Bass v. Miss Porter’s School, a case involving
harassment of a high school student at an elite boarding school,
the plaintiff objected to a discovery request for information
from his Facebook profile.52 Again, the court found a low
threshold for the discovery of social networking information.
The court held:
Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user‟s
relationships and state of mind at the time of the
content‟s posting. Therefore, relevance of the
content of [p]laintiff‟s Facebook usage as to both
liability and damages in this case is more in the
eye of the beholder than subject to strict legal
demarcations, and production should not be
limited to [p]laintiff‟s own determination of what
or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by
local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that
is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity
to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties‟ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.
49. Order on Discovery, supra note 42, at 5.
50. Id. at 9-10. This content included third-party communications,
videos, and photographs posted on Facebook and MySpace. Id.
51. Id. at 6.
52. No. 3:08CV1807(JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27,
2009).
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may be “reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.”53
Thus, the court in Bass upheld the broad relevancy
standard for discovery of social networking information, and
the result should be no different in the workers‟ compensation
context. Defense counsel should be able to discover information
that is relevant to allegations raised in the employee‟s initial
pleading,54 including information relating to the employee‟s
alleged work injuries or employment abilities.
Moreover, a federal magistrate judge in New Jersey found
writings shared on social networking sites to be discoverable.55
53. Id. (citations omitted); see also Oakes, Podolny & Woods, supra note
38 (“The court disagreed, holding that „Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of
the user‟s relationships and state of mind at the time of the content‟s posting‟
and that the content‟s relevance to both liability and damages would be „more
in the eye of the beholder than subject to strict legal demarcations‟ of what
one party determines might be „reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.‟”).
54. The plaintiff‟s initial pleading in non-workers‟ compensation state
court matters is typically known as the “complaint,” pursuant to the state‟s
rules of civil procedure. Workers‟ compensation courts and rules, however,
refer to the employee‟s first pleading by different terms, including “Claim
Petition” and “Employee Claim.” See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.291 (2008);
MINN. R. 1415.1000, subpt. 1 (2006); How to File a Claim, N.Y. ST. WORKERS‟
COMPENSATION
BD.,
http://www.wcb.state.ny.us/content/main/onthejob/howto.jsp (last visited Aug.
20, 2010).
55. Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., No. 2:06-cv-5377FSH-PS, slip op. at 5-6 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2007) (order denying motion for
reconsideration),
available
at
http://www.onpointnews.com/docs/anorexia2b.pdf [hereinafter Order Denying
Motion for Reconsideration]. This order modified an October 31, 2007, order
as follows:
(1) [N]o later than January 15, 2008, plaintiffs shall
produce writings shared with others including entries on
websites such as “Facebook” or “MySpace”; (2) plaintiffs
shall preserve journals, diaries and writings not shared
with others and if defendants‟ experts believe they are
needed to render an opinion then they can make an
application seeking their production; and (3) writings
shared with health care professionals shall be produced as
part of the medical records.
Id. at 5-6.
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In Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey,56 an
insurer sought production of all e-mails, journals, diaries, and
communications involving minor children‟s eating disorders or
manifestations and symptoms of the eating disorders.57
Magistrate Judge Patty Shwartz ordered the minors to produce
all entries on web pages, such as Facebook and MySpace,
which the minors had shared with others.58 Again, Beye
indicates that there is precedent for workers‟ compensation
courts to permit discovery of all entries on social networking
sites that relate to an employee‟s physical abilities.
4. Defenses to Formal Discovery
Even if a party establishes that discovery of an employee‟s
social networking profile information is relevant, a court may
exclude it from discovery “if it is privileged,” if its production
would impose an undue burden on the employee, or if the
employee “has superseding privacy interests in the account.”59
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) states that
discoverable information may be withheld if it is privileged.60
Privileged information may include information subject to the
attorney-client privilege, commercial trade secrets, private
settlement agreements, and employment confidentiality
agreements.61 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(b)
“provides that a party does not have to produce ESI that is „not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.‟”62

56. CIV. 06-5337, 2008 WL 3064757 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008).
57. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 55, at 5-6.
58. Id.
59. Blank, supra note 21, at 506; see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing
employee‟s defense of privacy).
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
61. See Blank, supra note 21, at 506. Such forms of privileged
information are generally not applicable to workers‟ compensation litigation,
where information is obtained from either the employee or social networking
provider directly, and the employer previously signed an insurance policy
agreeing to provide information to the insurer to assist in the defense of any
workers‟ compensation claim.
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). In practice, courts use a balancing test to
weigh the benefit and relevance of the information versus the burden and
cost of producing it. See Blank, supra note 21, at 506.
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5. Suggestions for Workers‟ Compensation Attorneys
Relating to Formal Discovery
In order to generate disclosure of social networking
information from the employee through the formal discovery
process, workers‟ compensation defense attorneys should ask in
their interrogatories (or other form of discovery demand
pursuant to their state‟s rules governing discovery) for the
names of any social networking sites used by the employee and
request copies of all relevant photographs, videos, postings,
communications, and discussions from social networking sites
relating to the employee‟s physical or employment abilities.63
Defense attorneys should include similar questions during the
employee‟s deposition.64 In order to comply with the rules
governing discovery, plaintiffs‟ attorneys should encourage
employees to disclose relevant social networking photographs,
videos, postings, and other communications in response to a
valid discovery request from defense counsel.
B. Discovery from Site Operators
In addition to obtaining social networking profile
information from the employee directly through the formal
discovery process, attorneys can recover the employee‟s profile
information from the social networking site operator under
some circumstances.65 In situations where an employee refuses
to disclose social networking profile information, or where the
defense attorney believes or knows the employee has deleted
all or part of his or her account, or has failed to disclose all
information, defense counsel should consider using a narrowly
tailored subpoena to the social networking site operator, as the
63. See Awsumb, supra note 4, at 24 (“Include interrogatories seeking
the identification of social networking sites used by a person and all user
profiles and accounts. Include document requests seeking production of
relevant information maintained or shared by a person on social networking
sites, including video and photos.”).
64. See id. (“Inquire regarding social networking usage during deposition
questioning.”).
65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). Rule 37(a) permits a party to make a motion
for an order to compel discovery from either a party or nonparty.
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records custodian, to provide copies of relevant photographs,
videos, and postings.66 Defense attorneys may also request that
information on a social networking site be preserved by
sending a preservation order to the site operator.67
In circumstances where an employee deactivated or
deleted her Facebook or other social networking account, the
site operator may continue to have a record of the user‟s
account information.68 If that information exists, social
66. See Blank, supra note 21, at 504 (“Social networking Web sites are
subject to subpoena just like any other business or person. As the custodian
of records, subpoenaing the social networking site itself may be the best way
to gain the information sought from the employee.”). The subpoena should be
very specific, including the user‟s full name, birthday, e-mail addresses, and
time period of the requested activity.
67. See Lori Paul, Paralegal Practice Tip: How to Subpoena MySpace
and Facebook Information, PARALEGAL BLAW BLAW BLAW (Oct. 10, 2009),
http://lorijpaul.com/?tag=litigation. Although sending a preservation order
allows the site operator to identify a user‟s account in order to preserve
information, a site operator cannot provide this information to a defense
attorney without a valid subpoena or permission of the user. See id. The
preservation order, however, can ensure a site operator retains access to an
employee‟s social networking profile information even after the employee
deletes or loses access to his or her account. See id.
68. See, e.g., Privacy Policy: Deactivating or Deleting Your Account,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Aug. 21, 2010)
(“If you want to stop using your account you may deactivate it or delete it.
When you deactivate an account, no user will be able to see it, but it will not
be deleted. We save your profile information (connections, photos, etc.) in case
you later decide to reactivate your account. Many users deactivate their
accounts for temporary reasons and in doing so are asking us to maintain
their information until they return to Facebook. You will still have the ability
to reactivate your account and restore your profile in its entirety.”). Facebook
also provides an option for users to delete an account permanently. Even
after a user requests to delete his or her account, Facebook retains the
account information for an undisclosed period of time, and may save
information indefinitely. See Privacy: Deactivating, Deleting, and
Memorializing Accounts, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=842
(last visited Aug. 21, 2010) (“Our system delays the deletion process in case
you change your mind and no longer want to permanently delete your
account.”); see also Maria Aspan, After Stumbling, Facebook Finds a Working
Eraser,
N.Y. TIMES,
Feb.
18,
2008,
at
C5,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/business/18facebook.html?_r=1 (stating
that deleting a Facebook account can be a very difficult and drawn-out
process, and “[a]fter deletion, there may still be a record in Facebook‟s
archives”); Don’t Forget Social Media in E-Discovery, WISC. L.J. (Mar. 31,
2010), http://www.wislawjournal.com/blog/2010/04/05/Don8217t-forget-socialmedia-in-ediscovery/ (discussing destruction of electronic evidence and
stating that “Facebook and Twitter retain user pages”); Facebook’s Privacy
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networking websites‟ privacy policies, including those of
Facebook and MySpace, specifically allow the social networking
provider to disclose user information in response to subpoenas,
court orders or a consent executed by the employee.69
Courts have upheld subpoenas to social networking site
operators “when the discovery sought is relevant to the
lawsuit.”70 Obtaining social networking information from the
site operator, however, would likely be a very lengthy and
costly process, contrary to workers‟ compensation‟s underlying
goal of efficiency.71 Therefore, obtaining such information from
the site operator would rarely be worth the cost and time to
defense counsel. This option, however, serves as a check on the
employee‟s ability to destroy or hide social networking
information in a workers‟ compensation case and provides for
more honest disclosure by employees.
Two potential defenses that employees72 and social
Policy:
Limitations
on
Removal,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php
(last
visited
Aug.
21,
2010)
(“Additionally, we may retain certain information to prevent identity theft
and other misconduct even if deletion has been requested.”).
69. Awsumb, supra note 4, at 24 (“The privacy policies of many service
providers, including Facebook and MySpace, permit the disclosure of user
information in response to subpoenas or court orders.”); see also Romano v.
Steelcase Inc., No. 2006-2233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 7, 2009) (order) (directing
the plaintiff to execute a consent to give the defendant access to the plaintiff‟s
deleted MySpace and Facebook pages and accounts).
70. See Blank, supra note 21, at 504-05. In Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., an employment law case, the magistrate judge upheld a subpoena to
Facebook and MySpace requiring them to produce user information because
the information sought was “reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of
admissible evidence.” No. 06-cv-01958-WYD-MJW, 2009 WL1067018, at *2
(D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009).
71. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
72. While generally a party in litigation does not have standing to object
to a subpoena served on a non-party to the action, it appears that an
employee has standing to object to a subpoena duces tecum that defense
counsel serves on a third-party site operator to the extent that defense
counsel seeks personal information or communications of the employee
protected by the Stored Communications Act. See, e.g., J.T. Shannon Lumber
Co. v. Gilco Lumber Co., No. 2:07CV119, 2008 WL 3833216, at *1 (N.D. Aug.
14, 2008) (holding that employee has standing to seek to quash subpoena
served on Internet service provider for production of employee‟s personal
information protected by the Stored Communications Act), quoted in Crispin
v. Christian Audigier, Inc., No. CV-09-09509 MMM (JEMx), 2010 WL
2293238, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2010).
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networking site operators alike have to the production of
employee information and communications by site operators
are that (i) the employee information and communications are
protected by the Stored Communications Act; and (ii) an
employee has a privacy interest in her social networking
information and communications that precludes disclosure by
the site operator.73 We analyze each of these defenses in turn.
1. Stored Communications Act
Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act (SCA)74
in 1986, as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act,75 to address voluntary and compelled disclosure of “stored
wire and electronic communications and transactional records”
by Internet service providers. Congress defined first what was
not allowed, with exceptions for what was, rather than defining
what was permissible, with exceptions for what was not.76
Congress also repeatedly distinguished between an “electronic
communication service” (ECS) provider and a “remote
computing service” (RCS) provider, delineating disclosure
prohibitions for each type of service.77 This distinction has
given courts headaches as they attempt to decide which
category describes various electronic communications, with

73. The employee could raise this second defense in response to a
discovery request she receives from defense counsel to produce information
and communications stored on a social networking site. See supra Part II.A.3.
But because, at least in the published case law, an employee has used that
defense only when discovery has been sought from the site operator, we
analyze it here.
74. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
75. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
76. For example, subsection (a) of section 2702 states first, “Prohibitions.
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)—a person or entity providing an
electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge . .
. .” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). Subsection (b) is titled “Exceptions for disclosure of
communications.” Id. § 2702(b).
77. “[The term] „electronic communication service‟ means any service
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or
electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). “[T]he term „remote
computing service‟ means the provision to the public of computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications system.” 18
U.S.C. § 2711(2).
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varying results.78 Social networking sites provide a unique
challenge, because they are neither purely e-mail-centered (like
Hotmail), nor purely community-based (like electronic bulletin
boards).79
It appears that courts have reached a consensus that social
networking sites, despite their variation in function, are ECS
providers to the extent they provide private messaging and the
messages have not been opened. Outlining the precedent it
followed, one court remarked that, since an ECS provider is
“any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send
or receive wire or electronic communications,” and “all three
[social networking] sites [(Facebook, MySpace, and Media
Temple)] provide private messaging or email services, the court
is compelled to . . . [hold] that such services constitute ECS.”80
Once the private e-mails have been opened by the recipient, the
social networking site operator is functioning as a “remote
computer service” provider, storing the messages for the
recipient.81 Whether the social networking sites are operating
as an ECS or RCS provider as to any particular message at any
particular time, they cannot disclose an employee‟s
communications without permission of the employee.82
The one court that has decided the precise issue of whether
personal information and communications on social networking
sites are protected by the SCA said that social networking sites
78. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., No. CV-09-09509 MMM
(JEMx), 2010 WL 2293238, at *13-15 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2010) (discussing
cases with divergent holdings).
79. See id. at *9; see also id. at *14 (“[T]he difficulty in interpreting the
statute is „compounded by the fact that the [SCA] was written prior to the
advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. As a result, the existing
statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of communication
like [Facebook and MySpace]. Courts have struggled to analyze problems
involving modern technology within the confines of this statutory framework,
often with unsatisfying results.‟” (quoting Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002))); Blank, supra note 21, at 488 (“The
existence of social networking Web sites challenges the current mechanisms
of e-discovery, and it remains unknown whether litigants may require an
employer to provide information about employees‟ social networking
activity.”).
80. Crispin, 2010 WL 2293238, at *9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at *13.
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
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are alternatively either an ECS or RCS with regard to posts on
message or bulletin boards or a user‟s Facebook “wall,”83 and
regardless of a site‟s classification, it cannot disclose such posts
without permission of the employee.84 However, if there are no
privacy settings protecting the employee‟s social networking
profile, such that her message board or “wall” is available to
the public,85 the SCA would not apply.86
Social networking site operators can disclose employee
information or communications to defense counsel with
permission of the employee.87 The SCA allows site operators to
“divulge a record or other information pertaining to a
subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the
contents of communications covered by subsection (a)(1) or
(a)(2))” with the customer‟s consent.88 So, for example, if an
employee has deleted her account but authorizes a social

83. See Crispin, 2010 WL 2293238, at *14-16.
84. Id.
85. Cf. Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 438 n.3 (Md.
2009) (“Social networking sites and blogs are sophisticated tools of
communication where the user voluntarily provides information that the user
wants to share with others. Web sites, such as Facebook and MySpace, allow
the user to tightly control the dissemination of that information. The user can
choose what information to provide or can choose not to provide information.
The act of posting information on a social networking site, without the poster
limiting access to that information, makes whatever is posted available to the
world at large.”).
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (“It shall not be unlawful under this
chapter or chapter 121 of this title for any person—(i) to intercept or access
an electronic communication made through an electronic communication
system that is so configured so that such communication is readily accessible
to the general public.”).
87. See, e.g., Barnes v. Cus Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-0764, 2010 WL
2196591, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2010) (“Facebook does point out that it is
willing to provide information from its files with the consent of [the user]. . . .
[T]here was some indication that [said user] would be willing to sign a
consent for this material to be furnished to the Magistrate Judge for review.
If that in fact could be accomplished, then future problems concerning
potential access to this material could be avoided.”); Mackelprang v. Fid.
Nat‟l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06CV00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL
119149, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (“In response to the subpoena,
MySpace.com produced certain „public‟ information regarding the two
accounts, but refused to produce private email messages on either account in
the absence of a search warrant or a letter of consent to production by the
owner of the account.”).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c).
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networking site operator to release her information and
communications to defense counsel, the site operator can do so.
Additionally, it might even be possible in the case of an
employee‟s prosecution of a workers‟ compensation claim for
the judge to compel the employee to sign a consent form for the
release of her account information and communications from a
site operator, if relevant to the employee‟s claim.89 It is more
likely that a judge would not do so, however, and weigh the
employee‟s failure to consent to the release of the information
in his or her evaluation of the employee‟s claim.
2. Privacy
While an employee could argue that she has a privacy
interest in her social networking profile information precluding
disclosure, that argument is likely to fail in workers‟
compensation courts.90 It is undisputed in the case law that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy when she
has an account with a social networking site or Internet service
provider: “[A] person has no expectation of privacy in Internet
subscriber information. . . . [This is consistent with] settled
federal law that a person has no reasonable expectation of
89. See, e.g., Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1446 (Ct.
App. 2006) (“Where a party to the communication is also a party to the
litigation, it would seem within the power of a court to consent to disclosure
on pain of discovery sanctions.”); see also Bruce Nye, More About Facebook:
How to Get Facebook Records in the Litigation Arena, CAL BIZ LIT (Aug. 24,
2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.calbizlit.com/cal_biz_lit/2009/08/more-aboutfacebook-how-to-get-facebook-records-in-the-litigation-arena.html.
90. See Blank, supra note 21, at 510 (“When employees place
information on the Internet without taking measures to protect the
information, the employee does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in such information because the Internet is a public medium. A person cannot
maintain a subjective belief that information placed on the Internet will be
kept private since such actions show the person wishes to waive their privacy
interest. Most notably, one court has suggested that even when protectionist
measures, such as password-protecting access to materials placed on the
Internet, are taken, the materials are not considered private because they
could be accessed by the public.” (citing United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F.
Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002))). Any right to privacy the employee has is
not absolute. In the workers‟ compensation context, it is likely that an
overriding objective is “facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection
with legal proceedings.” See Kahn v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 752,
765 (Ct. App. 1987).
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privacy in information exposed to third parties, like a
telephone company or bank.”91 An employee likewise does not
have a privacy interest in what she posts to her profile on a
social networking site.92 Even if the employee protects her
information on a social networking site with privacy settings,
she still does not have a privacy interest in what is posted or
communicated to or through her account.93
III. Professional Responsibility Issues in Discovery of
Employee Information from Social Networking Sites
This Part explores issues of professional responsibility that
arise for a plaintiff‟s attorney and defense counsel in
connection with an employee maintaining and producing, and
defense counsel discovering, information about an employee

91. Courtright v. Madigan, No. 09-CV-208-JPG, 2009 WL 3713654, at *2
(S.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2009) (“The logic of these cases extends to subscriber
information revealed by Plaintiff to MySpace.com. In sum, because Plaintiff
had no reasonable expectation that the fact or existence of his MySpace.com
account would remain private, neither the request by the Attorney General‟s
Office for that information nor the disclosure of that information by
MySpace.com violated Plaintiff‟s Fourth Amendment rights.”); see also Doe v.
Shurtleff, No. 1:08-CV-64-TC, 2009 WL 2601458, at *5 (D. Utah Aug. 20,
2009) (“In Perrine, for example, when law enforcement obtained records from
Yahoo! linking a screen name to an IP address registered to the defendant,
the Tenth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated
because the defendant had no expectation of privacy in information he had
voluntarily transmitted to a third-party Internet provider.” (citing United
States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008))).
92. See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 863-64
(Ct. App. 2009) (holding that an ode posted on MySpace.com was considered
sufficiently public that the poster waived any privacy interest in the online
rant).
93. See Blank, supra note 21, at 511 (“Even if a user restricts access to
their information through the site‟s privacy settings, most social networking
sites warn users that they cannot control how recipients may distribute their
information. The possibility of inadvertently publicizing „private‟ user content
on social networking Web sites makes an objective expectation of privacy
unreasonable.” (footnote omitted)); see also Nye, supra note 89 (“So, bottom
line: social networking posts may not be private at all; if they are, the privacy
right is not absolute, and the defense can overcome the privacy protection by
demonstrating their relevance. . . . [O]nce that is done, the court has the
authority to require the plaintiff to sign an authorization or release, and at
that point, Facebook, MySpace or whomever will have to respond to a
subpoena.”).
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stored on a social networking site.
A. Professional Responsibilities of the Plaintiff’s Attorney
Plaintiffs‟ attorneys should advise their clients of the risks
of posting information and photographs, and communicating
through, social networking sites.94 Employees should not post
any information or photographs that they do not want the
employer or insurance company‟s lawyer to know or see—such
as descriptions or pictures of the employee engaging in physical
activities95—and not provide anyone who they do not know
access to their profiles.96 Additionally, counsel should advise
their clients not to post days and times of activities, as that
could give investigators additional opportunities to conduct
surveillance.97 Of course, to the extent the workers‟
compensation claim is fraudulent and the lawyer knows so, the
lawyer cannot represent the client in the prosecution of her
claim.98 But the mere fact that an employee‟s information or
94. See, e.g., Floridians with Workers’ Compensation and Personal Injury
Cases Should Be Cautious When Posting on Social Networking Sites Like
Facebook,
JOHNSON
&
GILBERT,
P.A.,
http://www.mylegalneeds.com/library/facebook-posts-could-damage-yourflorida-workers-comp-or-pi-case.cfm (last visited June 7, 2010) (“However,
there are some precautions you can take to protect yourself, short of
boycotting the Internet all together. First, be vigilant in reviewing the photos
and posts on your social networking site. Remove anything that you would
not want an insurance company lawyer to see that could help defend against
your case. Next, [c]heck your privacy settings which enable you to block
certain people from seeing you on a particular site (Facebook allows this). It
is also helpful to search your name in the search field and see what comes up
to make sure it is acceptable (it is advisable to do this on Google and YouTube
as well). Finally never accept friend requests or respond to emails from
people you do not know.”).
95. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Awsumb, supra note 4, at 25.
97. See Ceniceros, supra note 31 (“It‟s common for claimants to load
their social networking sites with dates, easing the way for investigators and
their cameras to find them.”).
98. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2010) (“A lawyer
shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel
or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope,
meaning or application of the law.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R.
4.1(b) (2010) (“In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
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photographs on a social networking site contradict the
plaintiff‟s claim does not mean an employee‟s claim is
fraudulent, because often interpretation of what a person posts
on a social networking site depends on its context.99 A
plaintiff‟s attorney also needs to keep in mind that a lawyer
“generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing
counsel of relevant facts.”100 However, the employee‟s lawyer
might have an obligation to provide relevant information or
photographs to a defense attorney in response to an
interrogatory, document request, or other form of discovery
demand, if the plaintiff can still access what the defense
attorney seeks.101
However, plaintiff‟s counsel cannot advise her client to
delete information or photographs stored on a social
networking site to the extent that what is stored on the site is
potentially relevant to the employee‟s claim. According to
Model Rule 3.4(a), “A lawyer shall not [„counsel or assist
another person to‟] unlawfully obstruct another party‟s access
to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document

knowingly: . . . (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a
client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”). As one plaintiff‟s
attorney commented in response to learning of a non-client plaintiff whose
personal injury case was destroyed by information defense counsel learned of
on Facebook, “The plaintiff was dishonest, and as a personal injury attorney I
don‟t want anything to do with representing dishonest people. In fact, I tell
my clients, I can always deal with the truth but a single lie can kill an
otherwise good case.” When Facebook Isn’t a ‘Friend’ to Your Personal Injury
Case,
N.Y.
INJ.
L.
BLOG
(July
1,
2009,
12:34
PM),
http://www.zifflaw.com/NYInjuryLawBlog/personal-injury-victims-cautiousfacebook-privacy; see also Roberto Ceniceros, Facebook Job Boast Leads to
Workers Comp Fraud Charges, BUS. INS. (Sept. 14, 2010, 12:29 PM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20100914/NEWS/100919959.
99. See Jodi Ginsberg, How Facebook Can Undermine Your Workers’
Compensation Case, GA. WORKERS COMPENSATION BLOG (July 11, 2009),
http://www.georgiaworkerscompblog.com/2009/07/11/how-facebook-canundermine-your-workers-compensation-case/ (“Photos and updates can easily
be taken out of context. Even your frequency of posting can be used as
evidence that you have the capacity to perform clerical type of work. Posts on
Facebook and other social media sites can be used against you to put you on
the defensive and as leverage to reduce the value of your case.”).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2010).
101. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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or other material having potential evidentiary value.”102 The
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers counsels
similarly: “A lawyer may not destroy or obstruct another
party‟s access to documentary or other evidence when doing so
would violate a court order or other legal requirements, or
counsel or assist a client to do so.”103 Consequently, the
employee‟s attorney should advise his or her client to proceed
with caution in posting information to a social networking site,
but should not advise the client to destroy information that
already exists when the attorney assumes representation of the
employee.
B. Professional Responsibilities of Defense Counsel
There could be a lot of information relevant to an
employee‟s workers‟ compensation case publicly available on
Facebook or another social networking site,104 and defense
counsel could find it because many potential plaintiffs in
workers‟ compensation cases do not protect their profiles with
increased privacy settings.105 There is nothing unethical about
a defense attorney or an agent of the attorney accessing an
employee‟s information and photographs stored on a social
networking site that are not protected with privacy settings
that block public access.106 The employee would have no
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2010); id. cmt. 2
(“Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a
claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing
party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or
subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be
frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed.”).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118(2)
(2000).
104. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
105. See John Browning, What Lawyers Need to Know About Social
Networking
Sites,
DALL.
B.
ASS‟N
NEWS
(Feb.
1,
2009),
http://www.dallasbar.org/about/news-archives.asp?ID=240
(“While
both
MySpace and Facebook feature various privacy settings and controls,
enabling users to restrict certain information from public view, studies have
shown that a surprisingly high percentage of users are unfamiliar with the
protection afforded by these settings.”).
106. See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862 (Ct.
App. 2009) (“Here, Cynthia publicized her opinions about Coalinga by posting
the Ode on MySpace.com, a hugely popular Internet site. Cynthia‟s
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privacy interest in the information and photographs she has
posted.107 Scouring the Internet for publicly available
information on a social networking site is no different than the
video surveillance in a public place that defense counsel may
authorize in a workers‟ compensation case,108 and has actually
replaced video surveillance as a popular form of
investigation.109 It should be routine for defense counsel (or, at
affirmative act made her article available to any person with a computer and
thus opened it to the public eye. Under these circumstances, no reasonable
person would have had an expectation of privacy regarding the published
material.”); N.Y. St. Bar Ass‟n Comm. on Prof‟l Ethics, Op. 843, at 3 (2010)
(“A lawyer who represents a client in a pending litigation, and who has access
to the Facebook or MySpace network used by another party in litigation, may
access and review the public social network pages of that party to search for
potential impeachment material.”).
107. See Moreno, 91 Cal. Rtpr. 3d at 862.
108. See Mara E. Zazzali-Hogan & Jennifer Marino Thibodaux, Friend
or Foe: Ethical Issues for Lawyers to Consider When ‘Friending’ Adverse
Witnesses
Online,
197
N.J.
L.J.
726
(2009),
available
at
http://www.gibbonslaw.com/files/1251901206.pdf (“A good rule of thumb for
attorneys before poking around cyberspace is to consider whether an
analogous noncyberspace situation would raise concerns. For example,
viewing the public portion of a person‟s MySpace page or his post on a public
message board is analogous to conducting surveillance on a subject. In both
instances, there is no communication made with the person, nor is any
misrepresentation made about the investigating individual‟s identity. The
conduct would not invade a zone of privacy in either circumstance. Similarly,
videotaping someone walking down the street, such as a plaintiff in a
personal injury case, is akin to printing out information a person publicly
posts online for all to see. The videotape or printout is a record of what that
person has held out to the public.”). Also, the Professional Guidance
Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association said that there is nothing
unethical about a lawyer, or an agent of a lawyer, forthrightly asking a
witness (who is not represented by an attorney) for access to her social
networking profile. Phila. Bar Ass‟n Prof‟l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02, at 1
(2009), available at
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/We
bServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf (“The inquirer could
test that by simply asking the witness forthrightly for access. That would not
be deceptive and would of course be permissible.”). However, the lawyer could
not ask an employee, represented by an attorney, for such access without
going through the employee‟s attorney. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT
R. 4.2 (2010) (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.”).
109. See Ceniceros, supra note 31 (“„It‟s the new video camera,‟ Pierre
Khoury, a special investigator for Harleysville Group Inc., a Harleysville,
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minimum, the insurance company) to search the Internet, at
least in a popular search engine such as Yahoo! or Google, for
information that is publicly available about an employee.110
But what about information or photographs on a social
networking site regarding an employee that are not publicly
available because the employee has them protected with
security settings?111 Can an attorney direct a third-party agent
to “friend” the employee in hopes of gathering relevant
evidence about the plaintiff?112 A Philadelphia Bar Association
opinion addressed a similar question.113 The inquirer-attorney
asked about the propriety of an agent “friending” an
unrepresented non-party witness on Facebook and MySpace,
whose testimony was adverse to the inquirer‟s client.114 The
inquirer stated that the agent would state only truthful
information—e.g., she would use her real name—but would not
state her affiliation with the attorney.115 The inquirer wanted
the agent to provide him with access to the witness‟s profiles on
MySpace and Facebook because “the inquirer believe[d] that
Pennsylvania-based insurer, says of the social networking sites. „Now we
have a new kind of video camera, but we are not actually the ones filming.
They are filming it for us.‟”).
110. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010) (“A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
111. See Denise Howell & Ernie Svenson, Ins and Outs of Social
Networking for Lawyers: How Tough Is It to Cast Your Profile Into Infinity?,
L.
PRAC.
MAG.,
Jan.
2008,
at
47,
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/lpm/magazine/articles/v34/is1/pg47.shtml
(“One
important difference is the functionality of the sites‟ privacy controls. For
those who take the time to examine and tweak their privacy settings,
Facebook makes it possible to funnel certain information only to certain
parties.”).
112. “Dissembling” or “pretexting,” whatever the medium, is the practice
of a lawyer or a lawyer‟s subordinate either pretending to be someone he or
she is not, lying, or being deceitful about his or her intentions, all for the
purpose of obtaining information from an adverse party or witness. See Eric
Cooperstein, Facebook Ethics: It’s Not About Facebook, LAWYERIST.COM (June
23, 2009), http://lawyerist.com/facebook-ethics-it%E2%80%99s-not-aboutfacebook/.
113. Op. 2009-02. In general, there is a lack of authority on these
questions. See, e.g., Zazzali-Hogan & Thibodaux, supra note 108, at 726
(noting that there is no New Jersey authority on point).
114. Op. 2009-02, at 1.
115. Id.
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the pages maintained by the witness [contained] information
relevant to the matter in which the witness was deposed, and
could be used to impeach the witness‟s testimony should she
testify at trial.”116
First, the opinion states that, under Pennsylvania Rule of
Professional Conduct 5.3,117 which is identical to Model Rule
5.3,118 an attorney is responsible for the conduct of a nonlawyer who “friends” the employee on the attorney‟s behalf.
According to the opinion:
But the inquirer plainly is procuring the conduct,
and, if it were undertaken, would be ratifying it
with full knowledge of its propriety or lack
thereof, as evidenced by the fact that he wisely is
seeking guidance from this Committee.
Therefore, he is responsible for the conduct
under the Rules even if he is not himself
engaging in the actual conduct that may violate a
rule.119
116. Id.
117. PA. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2010). Rule 5.3 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in part:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or
associated with a lawyer:
....
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of [a nonlawyer
over whom the lawyer has “direct supervisory authority”]
that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if: the lawyer orders or,
with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; . . . .
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2010).
119. Op. 2009-02, at 2. Another employee of the employer, such as the
employee‟s supervisor, could already be “friends” with the plaintiff-employee,
in which case the other employee could voluntarily, or be compelled to, share
information with defense counsel that the plaintiff has posted on a social
networking site. If the other employee is unrepresented, defense counsel
cannot misrepresent that she is uninterested. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L
CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2010) (“In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is
not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer
is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer‟s role in the matter, the
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The bar association does not distinguish between the activities
of an investigator or paralegal and the activities of a junior
lawyer who the lawyer handling the case is supervising.120
The lawyer is not responsible under Model Rule 5.3 for the
actions of an investigator hired by the client who “friended” an
employee as long as the investigator was not “employed,
retained, or associated with the attorney.”121 Additionally, the
communication between the investigator and the employee
would be communication between parties, not between an
attorney and an opposing party, and it would therefore not be
prohibited by Model Rule 4.2.122 Consequently, defense counsel
in a workers‟ compensation case is not acting unethically if an
investigator hired by the insurance company “friends” the
employee on a social networking site, as long as the lawyer
does not encourage the investigator to do so and the
investigator is not associated with her, and defense counsel
could potentially use the information or photographs that the
investigator uncovers in defending the employee‟s claim.123 It is
not relevant to the lawyer‟s culpability whether the
investigator used her real identity or not: what is critical is the
lack of any relationship between the lawyer and the
investigator.
Second, the Philadelphia Bar Association opinion states
that the attorney‟s proposed conduct violates Pennsylvania

lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.”).
120. See Op. 2009-02; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 5.1(b)
(2010) (“A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the
Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
121. State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof‟l & Judicial Ethics,
Ethics Op. RI-153 (1993) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 5.3),
available at 1993 WL 274201. In the scenarios described in the Michigan
ethics opinion, insurance investigators used pretexts to film workers‟
compensation claimants acting inconsistently with their claimed injuries.
Because the insurance company, and not defense counsel, hired the
investigators, they “[were] agents of the company, not agents of the lawyers,”
and the investigators “[were] not encompassed by the professional rules
applicable to lawyers.” Id. at 2.
122. See id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.2).
123. See infra Part IV.
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Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c),124 the same as Model Rule
8.4(c).125 According to the opinion, it is deceptive for a nonlawyer working on defense counsel‟s behalf to attempt to access
an employee‟s profile on a social networking site while omitting
a material fact—“that the third party who asks to be allowed
access to the witness‟s pages is doing so only because he or she
is intent on obtaining information and sharing it with a lawyer
for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness.”126
The fact that the witness might permit anyone to access her
profile does not excuse deceit.127 The Professional Guidance
Committee distinguishes the inquiry before it from the
ordinary surveillance context—in the latter the videographer
films, photographs, or observes the employee as she presents
herself to the public and does not have to ask permission to
gain access to a private area.128 The inquirer of the
124. Rule 8.4 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct
provides, in part: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c) engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” PA.
RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2010).
125. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2010).
126. Phila. Bar Ass‟n Prof‟l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02, at 3 (2009),
available at
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/We
bServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf (“The omission would
purposefully conceal that fact from the witness for the purpose of inducing
the witness to allow access, when she may not do so if she knew the third
person was associated with the inquirer and the true purpose of the access
was to obtain information for the purpose of impeaching her testimony.”).
127. Id. (“The possibility or even the certainty that the witness would
permit access to her pages to a person not associated with the inquirer who
provided no more identifying information than would be provided by the third
person associated with the lawyer does not change the Committee‟s
conclusion. Even if, by allowing virtually all would-be „friends‟ onto her
Facebook and MySpace pages, the witness is exposing herself to risks like
that in this case, excusing the deceit on that basis would be improper.
Deception is deception, regardless of the victim‟s wariness in her interactions
on the internet and susceptibility to being deceived. The fact that access to
the pages may readily be obtained by others who either are or are not
deceiving the witness, and that the witness is perhaps insufficiently wary of
deceit by unknown internet users, does not mean that deception at the
direction of the inquirer is ethical.”).
128. See id.; see also Zazzali-Hogan & Thibodaux, supra note 108, at 726
(“The waters are muddied, however, when an attorney‟s concealment of the
facts becomes a variable in the equation. The hypothetical we present is
problematic because the paralegal attempting to „friend‟ the subject would
not disclose his relationship with the attorney and his true intentions. The
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Philadelphia Bar Association opinion proposed that his agent
use a truthful identify;129 one issue that arises is whether the
lawyer‟s conduct runs more unquestionably afoul of Rule 8.4(c)
if the lawyer instructs an agent to use a false identity in trying
to “friend” an employee. While there is no authority on this
latter point, it certainly appears that such conduct is
“deceitful.”
Last, the opinion states that a non-lawyer who friends an
adverse witness at the direction of an attorney violates
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 4.1130 and 8.4(a)131
paralegal‟s conduct is more invasive than simple surveillance but more
importantly, it would occur under false pretenses. An analogy outside of the
cyberspace context is if the paralegal knocked on the party‟s door; the party,
without questioning the visitor‟s background or motives, allowed him to come
inside; and, they engaged in a discussion that included information relevant
to the lawsuit. While the party‟s voluntary act of allowing the paralegal to
enter her home—like the party‟s voluntary acceptance of an online invitation
to become „friends‟—may mitigate invasion of privacy concerns and call into
question the party‟s discretion, the element of deception still exists. Until a
New Jersey court or ethics committee makes a clear pronouncement, all
attorneys should exercise caution before becoming „friendly‟ with adverse
witnesses or parties on social networking sites.”); Clifford F. Shnier, Friend
or Foe?: Social Networking and E-Discovery, INSIDE COUNS. (Feb. 16, 2010),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/February-2010/Pages/Friend-orFoe--Social-networking-and-EDiscovery.aspx?page=1 (“If a personal injury
defense attorney hires an investigator to take videos of a plaintiff who claims
he is incapacitated due to injury, and the investigator catches that plaintiff
playing basketball, few courts would disallow that evidence and none would
see any reason to discipline the defense attorney. However, if that same
defense attorney asks his assistant to „friend‟ the plaintiff on Facebook, so as
to obtain information that the plaintiff doesn‟t make available on his page to
nonfriends, that crosses the ethical line.”).
129. Op. 2009-02, at 1.
130. PA. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2010) (“In the course of
representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person . . . .”); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2010); Browning, supra note 105 (“In
instances where it is not readily available, beware the ethical pitfalls that lie
in attempting to obtain access to such non-public material. Misrepresenting
who you are in order to become a „friend‟ and gain access could be considered
a violation of Rule 4.01 of the Professional Rules of Conduct.”).
131. PA. RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2010) (“It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another . . . .”); see MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R.
8.4(a) (2010); see also In re Luther, 374 N.W.2d 720, 720 (1985)
(reprimanding lawyer for violating DR-102(A)(4) and (6) in using false
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as well.132 The opinion notes that states differ on whether
lawyers and their agents can engage in deception in certain
types of investigations.133 Even in states such as Oregon, that
identity to gain information about debtors to initiate debt collection suits on
behalf of his creditor-client).
132. Op. 2009-02, at 4.
133. See id. at 4-6. Compare IOWA RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 32:8.4
cmt. 6 (2010) (“It is not professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients
or others about or to supervise or participate in lawful covert activity in the
investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights or in
lawful intelligence-gathering activity, provided the lawyer‟s conduct is
otherwise in compliance with these rules.”); N.Y. City Lawyers‟ Ass‟n Comm.
on
Prof‟l
Ethics,
Formal
Op.
737
(2007),
available
at
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications519_0.pdf
(distinguishing “dissemblance” from “dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation,
and deceit” and allowing lawyers to use deceit in investigations of intellectual
property and civil rights violations where no rights of third parties are
involved, the risk of harm is imminent, no other means exists to obtain the
necessary evidence, and the lawyer‟s and investigator‟s conduct do not
otherwise violate the ethical rules, including the no-contact rule); OR. RULES
OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2010) (“Notwithstanding paragraphs (a)(1), (3)
and (4) and Rule 3.3(a)(1), it shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer
to advise clients or others about or to supervise lawful covert activity in the
investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights,
provided the lawyer‟s conduct is otherwise in compliance with these Rules of
Professional Conduct. „Covert activity,‟ as used in this rule, means an effort to
obtain information on unlawful activity through the use of
misrepresentations or other subterfuge.”); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int‟l Collectors
Soc‟y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 475 (D.N.J. 1998) (“However, RPC 8.4(c) does not
apply to misrepresentations solely as to identity or purpose and solely for
evidence-gathering purposes. . . . The prevailing understanding in the legal
profession is that a public or private lawyer‟s use of an undercover
investigator to detect ongoing violations of the law is not ethically proscribed,
especially when it would be difficult to discover the violations by other
means.”), with In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176 (Colo. 2002) (“In this
proceeding, we reaffirm that members of our profession must adhere to the
highest moral and ethical standards. Those standards apply regardless of
motive. Purposeful deception by an attorney licensed in our state is
intolerable, even when it is undertaken as a part of attempting to secure the
surrender of a murder suspect.”). Perhaps, in a jurisdiction such as Iowa or
Oregon, it does not violate the Model Rules for a defense lawyer to supervise
a third party who “friends” an employee to gain access to her social
networking site if the lawyer believes that the employee is engaging in
unlawful activity, such as prosecuting a fraudulent workers‟ compensation
claim. For more on deception in undercover investigations under the
professional responsibility rules, see generally Barry R. Temkin, Deception in
Undercover Investigations: Conduct-Based v. Status-Based Ethical Analysis,
32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 123 (2008); Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive
Lawyering, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 577 (2005); and David B. Isbell & Lucantonio
N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover
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have an exception for a lawyer to use deceit in investigations,
the lawyer probably cannot use deceit when there is no
violation of law, as is often the case with no-fault workers‟
compensation claims.134 In some states, a situation where this
Philadelphia Bar Association opinion might be applicable in
the workers‟ compensation context, in addition to the case of a
fraudulent claim, is where a non-lawyer “friends” an employee
who has a profile on a social networking site that advertises a
business to the public.135
Whatever the ethics rules in a particular state, workers‟
compensation judges would have some discretion in whether
they find the efforts of defense counsel and their agents to gain
access to an employee‟s restricted social networking profile
Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions
Prohibiting Misrepresentation Under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791 (1995). For a criticism of the
narrowness of the exception for deceit in lawyer-supervised investigations in
New York, see Gerald B. Lefcourt, Fighting Fire with Fire: Private Attorneys
Using the Same Investigative Techniques as Government Attorneys: The
Ethical and Legal Considerations for Attorneys Conducting Investigations, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 397, 398-403 (2007). For a critique of lawyers hiring
investigators to engage in deceit, see Michael Bonsignore, Note, Rules Exist
for a Reason: A Commentary on Lawyers Hiring Investigators to Partake in
Deceptive Tactics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 655 (2008).
134. Or. State Bar Ass‟n, Ethics Op. 2005-173 (2005), available at 2005
WL 5679600. In the case where the attorney suspects the plaintiff of
breaching a duty, for example by filing a fraudulent claim, the lawyer can
“advise” or “supervise” covert behavior but not directly participate in it.
“[A]ny lawyer involvement in activity that includes the lawyer‟s direct
misrepresentation or deception runs counter to the fundamental tenet of
lawyer „honesty and personal integrity.‟” Id. (quoting In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966,
977 (Or. 2000)).
135. Cf. Baumann v. Joyner Silver & Electroplating, 47 W.C.D. 611,
1992 MN Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 622, at *15 n.3 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App.
Sept. 1, 1992) (“Among other objections, the employee objected to the
surveillance evidence based, apparently, on the claim the activities of
investigators posing as potential customers for employee‟s self-employed
business constituted improper direct communications between an attorney‟s
agent and a represented opposing party. Although we do not here reach this
contention, we note that the surveillance evidence to which employee objects
is not in the record before us. Since, in our view, surveillance contact in which
investigators seek to elicit only information which the employee would
normally provide to the public in the course of his or her public activities is
not proscribed conduct, we would in any event have needed to review the
specifics of the contact during the investigation to determine the presence or
absence of impropriety.”).
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deceitful.136 Evidence can, however, be admissible in a workers‟
compensation case even if an attorney violates the rules of
professional responsibility in obtaining it.137 But in certain
cases, a court might impose sanctions and not admit into
evidence what a lawyer obtains in violation of the Model
Rules.138
136. Cf., e.g., Rhoades v. Nabisco, Inc., 1985 WL 47399, at *3 (Minn.
Work. Comp. Ct. App. May 14, 1985) (Gard, J., concurring) (“I would affirm
the findings of the Compensation Judge because of the review standard
presently applicable to the Workers‟ Compensation Court of Appeals. I feel it
necessary to comment, however, upon the method used to investigate the case
and the contacts made with the employee after the attorney-client
relationship had been established and published. The majority has concluded
that the employers and insurers are entitled to reasonable investigative and
surveillance procedures and, undoubtedly, there are no limitations on the
investigative and surveillance procedures contained in the Workers‟
Compensation Law. There is the allegation of the use of a hidden camera, a
hidden microphone, a meeting established on pretense or pretext, and the
allegation of fraud and deceit. This Court is certainly aware that the method
of investigation and surveillance in workers‟ compensation cases has
occasionally involved such pretext and actual misrepresentation as to the real
intention of the party conducting the surveillance or investigation. It would
seem that, in the absence of legislation dealing with such conduct, that there
be considerable discretion in the trial judge with regard to the introduction of
evidence gathered by such means. I do not believe that the analogy of
entrapment is in any way applicable, since the law with regard to
entrapment in a criminal proceeding would not only not here be applicable,
but the conduct here does not constitute entrapment in any event.”);
Clemente-Volpe v. Workmen‟s Compensation Appeal Bd., 624 A.2d 666, 672
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (refusing to disturb referee‟s finding that surveillance
film was credible even though employee was “tricked by the investigators into
performing tasks that required lifting and bending”); Isadore v. Workers‟
Compensation Appeal Bd., 465 A.2d 1096, 1099 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983)
(finding motion pictures admissible even though investigator tricked
employee into performing acts inconsistent with alleged medical condition).
137. See Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., 1996 WL 705445, at *4 (Minn.
Work. Comp. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1996) (“This court may not construe or apply
non-workers‟ compensation statutes or rules to determine whether there has
been a violation of those statutes or rules. Furthermore, nothing in the
statute or rule cited by the employee [Minnesota Rule of Professional
Conduct 4.2] requires that evidence obtained in contravention of either the
statute or the rule be excluded from admission in a civil proceeding.”
(footnote omitted)); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof‟l & Judicial
Ethics, Ethics Op. RI-153 (1993), available at 1993 WL 274201 (“The
admissibility of the surveillance results is a question of law, not ethics, and
therefore will not be further considered.”).
138. See, e.g., Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Sales, Inc., 347 F.3d 693,
699-70 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding evidentiary sanctions—the exclusion from
evidence of conversations obtained in violation of the Model Rules—against
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The witness whose social networking profiles the lawyer
inquired about accessing in the Philadelphia Bar Association
opinion was not represented by counsel; if an employee is
represented by counsel, then there is risk of the lawyer, or a
third party acting under the supervision of the lawyer,
violating Model Rule 4.2 in “friending” the employee. Model
Rule 4.2 states, “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a
person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer
in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized do so by law or court order.”139
Pursuant to Model Rule 5.3, the lawyer cannot direct a nonlawyer to contact, or “friend,” the employee on the lawyer‟s
behalf.140 This is no different than the physical surveillance
context where an attorney who represents the employer and
the insurance carrier potentially violates Model Rule 4.2 if an
investigator, who is the attorney‟s agent, engages the employee
in conversation during the course of the investigator‟s
surveillance.141
The same exceptions to the prohibitions in Rule 8.4 that
apply in cases where deception is authorized in particular
states would also likely apply here. But little in this area is
certain, because as the technologies develop, so does the
application of the ethics rules. What is certain, however, is that
Rules 4.2 and 5.3, in addition to the Philadelphia Bar
Association opinion, suggest, at minimum, that defense counsel

attorney who, in violation of Model Rules 4.2 and 8.4(c), supervised an
investigation where investigators deceitfully posed as customers of the
plaintiff and secretly tape recorded conversations).
139. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010).
140. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
141. See State Bar of N.C., 2003 Formal Ethics Op. 4, available at
http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?page=332&keywords=6. Whether the
information obtained through the prohibited contact is admissible is a
separate question. See id. (“The Ethics Committee declines to opine on the
admissibility of evidence. However, to discourage unauthorized
communications by an agent of a lawyer and to protect the client-lawyer
relationship, the lawyer may not proffer the evidence of the communication
with the represented person, even if the lawyer made a reasonable effort to
prevent the contact, unless the lawyer makes full disclosure of the source of
the information to opposing counsel and to the court prior to the proffer of the
evidence.”); see also infra Part IV.
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should proceed with considerable caution before having an
agent “friend” an employee.142
IV. Using Evidence Obtained from Social Networking
Sites in Litigation
Despite the prevalence of social networking, there are few
published cases discussing the use of social networking
evidence in litigation, and an absence of workers‟ compensation
cases on the use of social networking evidence. This Part
applies workers‟ compensation law, as well as pertinent state
and federal court cases discussing the admissibility of social
networking evidence and other forms of ESI, to offer guidance
on when social networking evidence should be admissible and
how judges should weigh it in workers‟ compensation litigation.
A. Admissibility of Evidence
Workers‟ compensation judges have broad discretion in
light of liberal rules of evidence, including rules as to hearsay
and authentication. Despite that discretion, compensation
judges may not disregard all traditional principles of evidence
applied by state and federal courts in deciding whether social
networking evidence is admissible.
1. Maintaining Relevancy Despite Relaxed Admissibility
Standards
In state court, when ESI is offered as evidence, judges
consider these types of questions:
(1) is the ESI relevant as determined by
[Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 401 (does it have any
tendency to make some fact that is of
consequence to the litigation more or less
142. But cf. State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof‟l & Judicial
Ethics, Ethics Op. RI-153 (1993), available at 1993 WL 274201 (advising that
the lawyer does not violate Model Rule 4.2 when the client, and not the
lawyer, hires and supervises the investigator).
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probable than it otherwise would be); (2) if
relevant under 401, is it authentic as required
by Rule 901(a) (can the proponent show that the
ESI is what it purports to be); (3) if the ESI is
offered for its substantive truth, is it hearsay as
defined by Rule 801, and if so, is it covered by an
applicable exception (Rules 803, 804 and 807); (4)
is the form of the ESI that is being offered as
evidence an original or duplicate under the
original writing rule, of [sic] if not, is there
admissible secondary evidence to prove the
content of the ESI (Rules 1001–1008); and (5) is
the probative value of the ESI substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
or one of the other factors identified by Rule 403,
such that it should be excluded despite its
relevance.143
As use of the Internet has become widespread, state courts are
becoming more accustomed to answering these types of
questions with regard to ESI, such as information from social
networking sites, and more liberal in admitting ESI into
evidence.144
Workers‟ compensation judges generally have broad
discretion145 and are not bound by state or federal rules of
143. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007);
see also THOMAS BUCKLES, LAWS OF EVIDENCE 13 (2003). After enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
originally providing a framework for the Federal Rules, were amended to
match the Federal Rules. Id. The majority of states currently have adopted
the Uniform Rules of Evidence or use them as a model. Id.; see also Uniform
Rules of Evidence Locator, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST. (Mar. 5,
2003), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/evidence.html.
144. See Robert C. Rodriguez, Decisions Reflect Importance, Limitations
of Evidence Obtained from Internet, LITIG. NEWS (Feb. 3, 2010),
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/020310-evidenceadmissibility-social-networking-saadi-dockery.html (“Courts are becoming
more comfortable with Internet evidence and perhaps more liberal in
allowing such information into evidence.”).
145. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (2008); Bey v. Oxford
Props., Inc., 481 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Minn. 1992) (“In view of the well recognized
principles that . . . the compensation judge is not bound by rules of evidence
or by technical or formal rules of pleading or procedure . . . .”). However,

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/1

40

2011]

SOCIAL NETWORKING & WORKERS’ COMP

41

evidence, and therefore social networking evidence may be
admitted even more liberally in workers‟ compensation courts
than in state or federal court.146 Relaxed rules of evidence
provide for informal and faster resolution of claims, consistent
with workers‟ compensation‟s underlying goal of efficiency.147
For example, one major obstacle to the admissibility of
social networking evidence in state or federal court is the
hearsay rule.148 Hearsay evidence that is inadmissible in state
workers‟ compensation courts generally cannot adopt rules of evidence that
are more restrictive than the state court rules of evidence. See, e.g., Fite v.
Ammco Tools, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Neb. 1977) (“[T]he compensation
court is empowered to admit evidence not admissible in the trial courts of this
state. It does not, as we understand it, grant to the compensation court the
right to establish rules of evidence which are more restrictive than the rules
applicable to the trial courts of this state.”).
146. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (“[T]he compensation
judge is bound neither by the common law or statutory rules of evidence nor
by technical or formal rules of pleading or procedure.”); In re Wilson, 911 P.2d
754, 758 (Idaho 1996) (“[I]n those areas where the Commission possesses
particular expertise, it has the discretionary power to consider reliable,
trustworthy evidence having probative value in reaching its decisions . . .
even if such evidence would not be ordinarily admissible in a court of law.”
(quoting Thom v. Callhan, 540 P.2d 1330, 1333 (Idaho 1975))); Roberts v. J.C.
Penney Co., 949 P.2d 613, 621 (Kan. 1997) (“We are not unaware of the
decisions holding that „[t]he rules of evidence . . . are not applicable in
workers‟ compensations proceedings. . . . The admissibility of evidence is
more liberal in compensation cases, not more restrictive.‟” (quoting Rodriguez
v. Henkle Drilling & Supply Co., 828 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992))
(internal quotations omitted)); Adkins v. R & S Body Co., 58 S.W.3d 428, 430
(Ky. 2001) (“[T]he principles that control the admissibility of evidence in a
personal injury action . . . do not apply to workers‟ compensation
proceedings.”). A few states, however, follow a contrary rule binding workers‟
compensation courts to the state rules of evidence. See, e.g., Paganelis v.
Indus. Comm‟n, 548 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (Ill. 1989) (“Except when the
[Workers‟ Compensation] Act provides otherwise, the rules of evidence apply
to Industrial Commission proceedings, including those conducted before the
arbitrator.”).
147. See Kenneth M. Berman, The Current State of Workers’
Compensation Law and Practice, 584 PLI/LIT 327, 330-31 (1998) (“The Acts
are typically administered by a Workers Compensation Commission . . . that
employ relaxed rules of evidence designed to provide for informal and rapid
resolution of claims.”).
148. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (“Hearsay evidence which
is reliable is admissible.”). Hearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court
statement offered in court to prove the truth of the mattered asserted. See
FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Even when judges are bound by hearsay rules, social
networking evidence is often admissible due to the hearsay exception for an
admission by a party opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).
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or federal court is often admissible in workers‟ compensation
courts.149 As the finder of fact, workers‟ compensation judges
have discretion to determine if hearsay evidence should be
excluded as “worthless rumor or gossip” or admitted as
persuasive and reliable evidence.150
Judges, however, may not entirely abandon the state court
rules of evidence.151 Workers‟ compensation courts are the
“gatekeepers” of what evidence to admit at trial,152 and, in
doing so, they are bound by a standard of relevance.153 Though
formulations vary, evidence is “relevant” if it “tends to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.”154
However, workers‟ compensation judges often admit hearsay evidence
directly. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Conley, 620 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2000)
(admitting hearsay evidence when the information is within the knowledge of
the employer); Chaisson v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 708 So. 2d 375, 382 (La.
1998) (providing that the “general rule” in workers‟ compensation courts “is
to allow hearsay evidence”); Lunde v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers‟
Compensation Div., 6 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Wyo. 2000) (stating that “a broad
range of informal evidence, including hearsay, is admissible in workers‟
compensation” courts).
149. See, e.g., Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., 1996 WL 705445, at *4-5
(Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1996) (admitting parts of investigative
reports that the employee alleged were hearsay).
150. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Indus. Comm‟n, 402 P.2d 414, 417 (Ariz.
1965) (“Much hearsay is worthless rumor or gossip, but there is also such a
thing as „persuasive hearsay‟ and the fact-finding commission may be given
credit for the ability to distinguish the one from the other.”).
151. See, e.g., Hudson v. Horseshoe Club Operating Co., 916 P.2d 786,
788-91 (Nev. 1996) (applying a relevancy standard for admissibility of
evidence in a workers‟ compensation matter); City of Pittsburgh v.
Workmen‟s Compensation Appeal Bd., 315 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1974) (“However, it has been held that section 422, and similar enactments
applicable to administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, are not authority for
denying parties in adversary proceedings fundamental rights embraced by
some rules of evidence.”).
152. Rodriguez, supra note 144 (“Lawyers should also keep in mind that
courts are essentially the “gatekeepers” of what evidence comes in at trial . . .
.”).
153. See MINN. STAT. § 176.411, subdiv. 1 (2008) (providing that
“findings of fact shall be based upon relevant and material evidence only”); 1
PA. CODE § 35.161 (1989) (“relevant and material evidence shall be
admissible”),
available
at
http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/001/chapter35/chap35toc.html.
154. FED. R. EVID. 401.
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State and federal courts apply the same relevancy
standard to ESI as to any other form of evidence.155 For
example, a Texas court admitted evidence from a mother‟s
MySpace profile in a family law matter. In terminating the
mother‟s parental rights, the Texas Court of Appeals
admitted—and relied upon—two MySpace pictures that “were
captioned, „At Ashley House Dranking it Up [sic],‟ and „Me
Helping Ashley Stand Up, Were Both Drunk [sic],‟” as well as
several photographs from a MySpace page showing the mother
at a bar.156
Similarly, workers‟ compensation courts should apply their
liberal evidentiary rules to admit social networking evidence
that is relevant, just as they do with traditional forms of
surveillance evidence. “[T]he admission of [surveillance]
evidence is within the discretion of the Workers‟ Compensation
Court.”157 In Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., an employee
injured his low back at work.158 Surveillance by the defense
found that the employee was exaggerating his limp, and later
surveillance, on video, showed the employee installing heating
ducts.159 The employee was receiving temporary total disability
benefits at this time and defense counsel filed a “notice of
intent to discontinue temporary total disability benefits” based
on the fact that the employee was working.160 Defense counsel
offered reports at hearing prepared by an investigation firm
the insurer hired to perform surveillance of the employee‟s
activities.161 The employee objected on the basis of hearsay,
arguing that the reports included statements made “by
unidentified third parties” to investigators, and that the

155. See, e.g., In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“We see
no justification for constructing unique rules for admissibility of electronic
communications such as instant messages; they are to be evaluated on a caseby-case basis as any other document to determine whether or not there has
been an adequate foundational showing of their relevance and authenticity.”).
156. Mann v. Dep‟t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01-08-01004-CV,
2009 WL 2961396, at *10 (Tex. App. Sept. 17, 2009).
157. Aken v. Neb. Methodist Hosp., 511 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Neb. 1994).
158. Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., 1996 WL 705445, at *2 (Minn.
Work. Comp. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1996).
159. Id. at *2.
160. Id. at *3.
161. Id. at *4.
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surveillance reports failed to identify which of several
investigators prepared which parts of the reports.162 The
defense argued that it had disclosed its intent to use the
investigative reports months prior and had given plaintiff‟s
counsel copies of the reports at that time.163 In addition, all but
one of the investigators attended the hearing and the plaintiff
was free to call them for cross-examination.164
The compensation judge excluded portions of the
investigative reports containing statements made by
unidentified non-parties, but admitted the rest of the reports
into evidence because the testimony of the supervising
investigator provided their foundation.165 On appeal, the
employee argued that the reports should be excluded because
they were unreliable hearsay due to the investigators‟
misrepresentations during their investigation, making the
investigators
unreliable
witnesses.166
The
workers‟
compensation court of appeals found that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence.167 Similarly,
workers‟ compensation judges have discretion to admit social
networking evidence, in some cases even if acquired
deceptively,168 as gathering evidence from a social networking
site is a form of surveillance.169 To the extent such information
is relevant to an employee‟s injuries or employment abilities,
and has the proper foundation and authentication, the court
should admit it into evidence.
2. Foundation and Authentication
Whether evidence is offered in electronic or paper form,
state and federal courts can admit the proffered evidence only
if, in addition to being relevant, it is properly authenticated.
Authentication “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.”170 The proffering party has to establish that there is a
reasonable basis for the court to draw this finding.171 As in
Keiser v. Dick Lind Heating Co., where the workers‟
compensation judge permitted surveillance evidence based on
the testimony of one of the investigating officers who was
available to the plaintiff for cross-examination,172 foundation
for authentication of social networking evidence can be
established by the investigator, attorney, or paralegal who
found the information about the employee on the social
networking site.173
Even with workers‟ compensation‟s relaxed evidentiary
rules, defense counsel has to establish that any information
from an employee‟s social networking account was posted by
the employee, because individuals can open social networking
accounts under the names of other people.174 It is important for
170. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). The party offering the evidence must lay a
foundation for the judge to find the evidence authentic. See, e.g., Ruiz v.
Virginia, No. 1915-07-4, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 566, at *12, *16 (Ct. App. Dec.
23, 2008) (“Foundation is a more general term for what the proponent of
evidence must establish before the evidence can be admitted. . . . [T]he
proponent of a document having the characteristics of a business record
establishes the proper evidentiary foundation for the introduction of the
document into evidence by establishing that the document is authentic.”).
Although workers‟ compensation judges are not bound by the federal or state
rules of evidence, this standard for authentication provides a starting point.
171. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542, 544
(D. Md. 2007) (“A party seeking to admit an exhibit need only make a prima
facie showing that it is what he or she claims it to be. . . . The degree of
foundation required to authenticate computer-based evidence depends on the
quality and completeness of the data input, the complexity of the computer
processing, the routineness of the computer operation, and the ability to test
and verify results of the computer processing.”).
172. Keiser, 1996 WL 705445, at *4.
173. Unlike surveillance evidence that is obtained through informal
discovery, social networking evidence may be obtained through formal
discovery as well. See supra Part II.A.3. When social networking evidence is
provided by the plaintiff in discovery, foundation and authentication are not
in issue, as the plaintiff does not dispute the authenticity of the evidence. In
cases where information from a plaintiff‟s social networking profile is
obtained by informal discovery, however, defense counsel has to authenticate
the evidence she seeks to introduce.
174. Cf. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 542-43 (indicating that courts examine
foundational requirements more carefully for electronically stored
information than for hard-copy documents); St. Clair v. Johnny‟s Oyster &
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the person who downloaded the information from the
employee‟s social networking account to be available to testify
as to when and how it was obtained and to confirm that the
copy is accurate.175 Defense counsel also has to offer proof that
the owner of the social networking account (the employee)
actually wrote what counsel is introducing. The normal
methods of proving authorship of social networking material
include the admission of the author or testimony of a witness
who observed the material‟s authorship.176 Another way to
authenticate such material is to demonstrate the writing
matches the plaintiff‟s distinctive style.177 If the plaintiff denies
that the information on the social networking profile is hers
despite a reasonable showing by defense counsel, the workers‟
compensation court can admit the evidence and evaluate the
employee‟s credibility in deciding how much weight to assign to
it.
3. The Notice Requirement
Although there are no workers‟ compensation rules specific
Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“[T]he Court holds no
illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on any web-site from any
location at any time.”); see also Keiser, 1996 WL 705445, at *4 (excluding
surveillance evidence from unidentified third parties). One major difference
between video surveillance and information gathered from social networking
sites is that, with electronically stored evidence, there is an issue as to the
source of the information, an issue raised in St. Clair. The Keiser court
indicates that defense counsel‟s inability to identify a source of information is
grounds for exclusion in workers‟ compensation cases. Keiser, 1996 WL
705445, at *4-5.
175. See Levine & Swatski-Lebson, supra note 14, at 3.
176. See id.
177. See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 544 (“Although Rule 901(a) addresses
the requirement to authenticate electronically generated or electronically
stored evidence, it is silent regarding how to do so. Rule 901(b), however,
provides examples of how authentication may be accomplished. It states: „(b)
Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with
the requirements of this rule: . . . (4) Distinctive characteristics and the like.
Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.‟”). Prior postings or
other writings by the plaintiff indicating a particular writing pattern, style,
or other identifiable characteristics may therefore be used to authenticate
social networking evidence.
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to notice or disclosure of social networking evidence obtained
through informal discovery, rules regulating the disclosure of
surveillance evidence should apply. In at least some states, in a
workers‟ compensation case, parties are required to make
pretrial disclosure of surveillance evidence to opposing parties,
to prevent unfair surprise or prejudice, or else they risk
preclusion from offering the evidence at the hearing or trial.178
To the extent that states do not have specific rules governing
notice or disclosure of surveillance evidence, ordinary rules of
notice and disclosure under the workers‟ compensation laws
should apply.
In giving notice of social networking evidence, defense
attorneys must provide copies to opposing counsel of what they
intend to introduce at hearing or trial.179 However, workers‟
compensation judges likely have the discretion to permit a
party to withhold disclosure of social networking and other
surveillance evidence until after the time of an employee‟s
deposition.180
178. See, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, subpt. 8(A) (2006) (“A party
possessing relevant surveillance evidence must disclose the existence of said
evidence to opposing parties . . . no later than 30 days prior to the hearing
date.”); 34 PA. CODE § 131.61(a) (2002), amended by 32 PA. BULL. 6043 (Dec.
7, 2002) (“Parties shall exchange all items and information, including medical
documents, reports, records, employment records, wage information,
affidavits, tapes, films and photographs, lists of witnesses, CD ROMs,
diskettes and other digital recordings, to be used in or obtained for the
purpose of prosecuting or defending a case, unless the foregoing are otherwise
privileged or unavailable, whether or not intended to be used as evidence or
exhibits.”); 34 PA. CODE § 131.68(a)(9) (2002), amended by 32 PA. BULL. 6043
(“The deposition may be used to locate, authenticate and obtain copies of
records which are material and relevant to the proceeding, including: . . . (9)
Surveillance.”); Mietelski v. Banks, 854 A.2d 579, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)
(finding that the trial court did not err in “excluding from the jury videotape
surveillance evidence of Appellee, Ireneusz „Eric‟ Mietelski, due to unfair
surprise and prejudice caused by late production of the tape”). Surveillance
evidence in workers‟ compensation matters could include “any photographic,
video, digital, motion picture, or other electronic recording or depiction of a
party surreptitiously taken or obtained without the party‟s expressed
permission or knowledge.” MINN. R. 1420.2200, subpt. 8(A). That definition
encompasses information, communications, and photographs from a social
networking site.
179. See, e.g., MINN. R. 1420.2200, subpt. 8(A).
180. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-61(1) (West 1990); Congleton v.
Shellfish Culture, Inc., 807 So. 2d 492, 496 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (“The power
to control when evidence is presented is well within the administrative law
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Although there is a liberal standard for the admissibility of
evidence, including hearsay, in workers‟ compensation courts,
evidence must be probative, trustworthy, and credible.181 As
administrative agencies, these courts have the power to
evaluate and weigh the credibility of evidence.182 Courts may
accept all or part of the testimony of any witness.183 In
determining credibility, workers‟ compensation judges often
pay close attention to evidence impeaching or contradicting an
employee‟s credibility,184 and this can include surveillance
evidence.
In Aken v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska overturned the workers‟ compensation court
of appeals and upheld the compensation judge who relied on
the defense‟s video evidence to find that the plaintiff lacked
credibility.185 The plaintiff in Aken worked as a nurse.186 She
judge‟s statutory power.”).
181. See Story v. Wyo. State Bd. of Med. Exam‟rs, 721 P.2d 1013, 1018
(Wyo. 1986) (“Where hearsay evidence is by statute admissible in
administrative proceedings, it is often held that it must be probative,
trustworthy and credible; and, although it may not be the sole basis for
establishing an essential fact and is insufficient to support an administrative
decision, it may be considered as corroborative of facts otherwise
established.”).
182. See Kloepfer v. Lumbermen‟s Mut. Cas. Co., 916 P.2d 1310, 1312
(Mont. 1996) (“The Workers‟ Compensation Court, as the finder of fact, is in
the best position to assess witnesses‟ credibility and testimony.”); Wagaman
v. Sioux Falls Constr., 576 N.W.2d 237, 242 (S.D. 1998) (“Department is
allowed to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the
witnesses.”).
183. See Jordan v. Workmen‟s Compensation Appeal Bd., 704 A.2d 1063,
1066 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (“[T]he factfinder in a workers‟ compensation
proceeding may accept the testimony of any witness in whole or in part.”).
184. See McGee v. J.D. Lumber, 17 P.3d 272, 278 (Idaho 2000)
(“Evidence impeaching a claimant‟s credibility need not be ignored . . . .”);
Schneider v. S.D. Dep‟t of Transp., 628 N.W.2d 725, 729-30 (S.D. 2001) (“The
Department, after hearing numerous inconsistent statements made by
Schneider, found Schneider to be not credible. „Where there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder‟s choice between them
cannot be clearly erroneous.‟” (internal citation omitted)).
185. 511 N.W.2d 762, 768-69 (Neb. 1994).
186. Id. at 765.
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argued that she was unable to perform her job duties as a
result of a work injury and called witnesses at her hearing to
testify to that effect.187 Evidence presented by both the plaintiff
and defendant at trial revealed conflicting diagnoses from
doctors.188 At the time of rehearing, the defense offered a report
by a private investigator that “described surreptitious visual
and videotaped surveillance” and the court admitted a
surveillance videotape of the employee.189
The plaintiff testified that, even on a “„good‟” day, she
“limped noticeably” and “a layman could see the limp.”190 The
surveillance tape, however, showed the plaintiff doing activities
such as walking, carrying a child, carrying boxes, and moving
furniture with ease and without any noticeable limping.191 The
court admitted the surveillance evidence and relied on it
heavily in terminating the employee‟s workers‟ compensation
benefits.192 The type of analysis and reasoning in Aken in which
the court admitted video surveillance evidence and
subsequently used it to weigh the plaintiff‟s credibility is likely
applicable to social networking evidence showing or discussing
an employee‟s participation in physical activities.193 If a
workers‟ compensation judge finds an abundance of evidentiary
inconsistencies, preventing a determination that the plaintiff‟s
injury is compensable, the employee has failed to meet her
burden of proof necessary to win the case.194
187. Id. at 766.
188. Id. at 765-66.
189. Id. at 766.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 768-69.
193. There are no published workers‟ compensation cases directly
discussing the credibility of social networking evidence. The Texas Court of
Appeals, however, considered the credibility of evidence from MySpace.com.
In re J.W., No. 10-09-00127-CV, 2009 WL 5155784, at *4 (Tex. App. Dec. 30,
2009) (“[T]he trial judge said that he would „consider the credibility of the
source‟—MySpace.”).
194. See Aken, 511 N.W.2d at 766 (“The evidence presents a question of
credibility. The Court received Exhibits 1-23 which included two videotapes
showing plaintiff walking briskly and carrying boxes. This evidence is wholly
inconsistent with plaintiff‟s assertions that she must walk on the sides of her
feet to avoid pain and must avoid all carrying of groceries and that her pain
has completely incapacitated her.” (quoting the compensation court panel));
see also In re Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971-72 (Wyo. 1996) (“Inconsistencies in
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A final evidentiary issue present in workers‟ compensation
cases is for the compensation judge to balance the probative
value of the evidence against the potential for unfair
prejudice.195 There is, again, an absence of workers‟
compensation cases addressing this particular issue with
regard to social networking evidence, but two federal court
cases are instructive. In United States v. Drummond,196 a
federal criminal case, the court discussed the admissibility of
pictures from a MySpace account, weighing the probative value
versus the danger of unfair prejudice.197 The court found the
photographs provide probative value as to whether the
defendant committed the crime at issue.198 The court went on
to discuss the possibility of the evidence being prejudicial to the
defendant.199 Ultimately, the court found that, depending on
the testimony presented at trial, the probative value of the
photographs may outweigh any danger of unfair prejudice.200
The court deferred on making a ruling, finding that it must
wait until the time of trial to rule based on whether the
testimony regarding the alleged crime and the defendant‟s
source of income is disputed at trial.201
the evidence that prevent the finder of fact from determining whether the
injury is compensable mean that the claimant has failed to meet his burden
of proof. A claimant cannot prevail if factors necessary to prove his claim are
left to conjecture.”).
195. This standard is based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 but is also
a universal standard used by workers‟ compensation judges. See, e.g., Dixon
Prop. Co. v. Shaw, 2 P.3d 330, 332 n.4 (Okla. 1999).
196. No. 1:09-CR-00159, 2010 WL 1329059 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2010).
197. Id. at *2.
198. Id. The MySpace photographs from Drummond depicted the
defendant holding wads of money and a gun. Id. at *1 (“The photos depict
Defendant counting, showing-off, and throwing large wads of cash while
wearing a hat and sunglasses. . . . Additionally, one photo depicts Defendant
either pretending to point a gun at the camera or pointing a gun at the
camera.”).
199. Id. at *2.
200. Id.
201. Id. (“[I]f testimony presents evidence that Defendant had no known
source of income and yet often had significant quantities of cash on-hand, but
Defendant disputes having possessed large amounts cash, it is possible that
the relevance of the photos could outweigh any unfair prejudice. . . . As the
Government suggests, possession of a firearm may be relevant to a charge of
drug trafficking because firearms are known to be „tools of the trade‟ of drug
trafficking. . . . However, the Government has not stated that testimony in
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An insurance law case addressing the admissibility of ESI
provides a closer comparison to workers‟ compensation for
evaluating the danger of unfair prejudice and its potential
consequences for both plaintiff and defendant. In Lorraine v.
Markel American Insurance Co., a boat insured by Markel
American Insurance was damaged by lightening.202 Magistrate
Judge Grimm raised and analyzed the issue of balancing the
danger of unfair prejudice against the probative value of emails, computer animations and simulations, and digital
photographs although neither the plaintiff nor defendant
directly raised this issue.203 In evaluating this final hurdle to
admissibility, Magistrate Judge Grimm stated that it is
generally better to admit evidence if there is any doubt about
the danger of unfair prejudice.204
Lorraine suggests that, in addressing the admissibility of
ESI, courts will play particular attention to the danger of
unfair prejudice outweighing the probative value of electronic
evidence when “the evidence would contain offensive or highly
derogatory language that may provoke an emotional
response.”205 Relevant social networking evidence should be
admissible in workers‟ compensation cases because it involves
an employee‟s physical capabilities and is unlikely to contain
offensive or derogatory language or depictions. Also, judges in
workers‟ compensations courts can control for emotional
persuasion in a way that judges sending cases to juries cannot,
reducing the risk of prejudice. Yet, workers‟ compensation
this case will support the assertion that Defendant or the members of his
conspiracy used firearms in furtherance of their drug-trafficking endeavors.
Therefore, it is unclear to the Court that, in this case, possession of a firearm
is intrinsic to the drug trafficking or conspiracy charged.”).
202. 241 F.R.D. 534, 534 (D. Md. 2007).
203. Id. at 584.
204. Id. (“Generally, „[i]f there is doubt about the existence of unfair
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading, undue delay, or waste of time, it is
generally better practice to admit the evidence, taking necessary precautions
of contemporaneous instructions to the jury followed by additional
admonitions in the charge.‟” (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN‟S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.02(2)(c) (Joseph M.
McLaughlin 2d ed. 1997))). Obviously, providing proper instructions to the
jury is not applicable to workers‟ compensation matters where decisions are
made by judges and not juries.
205. Id.
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attorneys do need to consider whether information from an
employee‟s social networking profile would “unfairly prejudice
the party against whom it is offered” or “unduly delay the trial
of the case.”206
Courts or legislators should not adopt rigid rules adopting
or banning evidence from social networking sites in workers‟
compensation cases. Rather, workers‟ compensation judges
should hear the evidence and decide whether to give it weight
and, if so, how much. Judges are gatekeepers of social
networking evidence, and they need to understand and
evaluate this form of technology in particular cases.
V. Conclusion
The lawyers, judges, insurance companies, and parties
within workers‟ compensation systems will increasingly
confront the discovery, privacy, professional responsibility, and
evidentiary issues that arise at the crossroads of workers‟
compensation law and social networking. In the absence of case
law and ethics opinions that discuss these exact issues, this
Article starts with the rules that govern workers‟ compensation
cases, and discusses how they might apply to lawyers
gathering, producing, and introducing evidence from social
networking sites. But this Article is only a starting point. As
workers‟ compensation systems are built on efficiency,
flexibility, and discretion, workers‟ compensation is an ideal
area of law for lawyers and judges to experiment with how to
address some of the unique challenges and opportunities that
social networking poses in litigation.
While there is a lack of legal authority on these issues,
that should not cloud the reality that many employees are
using social networking in their daily lives. One thing of which
we are certain is that lawyers who practice in the workers‟
206. Id. (“Thus, when a lawyer analyzes the admissibility of electronic
evidence, he or she should consider whether it would unfairly prejudice the
party against whom it is offered, . . . unduly delay the trial of the case, or
interject collateral matters into the case.”). The issue of undue delay plays
heightened importance in balancing probative value versus the danger of
unfair prejudice in workers‟ compensation cases because of workers‟
compensation‟s underlying emphasis on efficiency.
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compensation field need to be able to navigate around social
networking sites, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and MySpace,
and know how they work. Social networking is no longer a new
technology, and ignorance should not be an excuse to the
applicability of evidence from social networking sites in
litigation.
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